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CAN THE STATE PROCLAIM LIFE AFTER DEATH?
HELLERSTEDT AND REGULATING THE DISPOSITION OF
FETAL REMAINS
Thomas J. Molony*
Abstract
The United States Supreme Court dealt a significant blow to abortion
opponents in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, but the 2016 ruling
did not dampen their resolve. Just days after Texas lost the Hellerstedt
battle, the Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) returned
to the fight and proposed regulations requiring health care facilities to
inter or cremate the remains of aborted and miscarried fetuses.
Undeterred by a preliminary injunction entered against those regulations
once they became final, the Texas legislature enacted a law with similar
effect in June 2017.
The Texas law, however, proved to be good ground for yet another
victory for those who advocate choice. Having already found the DSHS
regulations wanting, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas enjoined the new statute, concluding that it was unlikely
to survive the undue burden test that the Supreme Court set out in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has now
followed suit with respect to an Indiana law regulating the disposition of
fetal remains. But rather than applying Casey’s undue burden test, the
appeals court determined that the Indiana statute could not survive even
the very deferential rational basis standard of review. Importantly, the
decisions of both the Texas district court and the Seventh Circuit conflict
with a 1990 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit to uphold a Minnesota fetal remains disposition law—in a case
tried before Roe v. Wade’s demanding trimester framework gave way to
Casey’s more lenient undue burden standard. Thus, three federal courts
are now in conflict, and the Supreme Court may need to step in yet again
to decide who is right.
Unfortunately, Hellerstedt provides no easy answer to the question of
whether fetal remains disposition requirements like those enacted in
Texas and Indiana can survive constitutional challenge. The Texas
legislation at issue in Hellerstedt purportedly advanced the state’s interest
in safeguarding maternal health, and thus one questions how the
Hellerstedt Court’s interpretation of Casey’s undue burden standard will
apply to abortion regulations that are founded on the state’s interest in
protecting potential life. What is certain, though, is that the Hellerstedt
Court did not overrule its decision either in Casey or in Gonzales v.
* Associate Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law.
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Carhart, both of which upheld measures aimed at encouraging a woman
to choose childbirth over abortion. This Article thus contends that, when
viewed in light of Casey and Gonzales, Hellerstedt’s interpretation of the
undue burden test leaves states with a great deal of latitude to regulate
abortion in a manner aimed at protecting potential life. As a result, efforts
to regulate the method of disposing of fetal remains should pass
constitutional muster.
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INTRODUCTION
Abortion foes are relentless. Within days after Texas suffered defeat
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (Hellerstedt I),1 the state’s
Department of State Health Services (DSHS) was at it again, proposing
regulations that would require health care facilities to bury or cremate the
remains of aborted and miscarried fetuses.2 Fetal remains disposition
1. See 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) [hereinafter Hellerstedt I] (concluding that Texas’s
admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements are unconstitutional).
2. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 222 (W.D. Tex. 2017)
[hereinafter Hellerstedt II] (“Four days after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Whole
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requirements were in the spotlight elsewhere on the same day when
abortion providers brought a challenge to a 2016 Louisiana law.3 And just
the day before, a federal district court had granted a preliminary
injunction against a fetal remains disposition law that Vice President
Mike Pence signed while he was Indiana’s governor.4
The flurry of activity surrounding fetal remains disposition
requirements in the wake of Hellerstedt I may foretell a “brand-new
front” in the battle over abortion.5 Thus far, however, it has not been a
successful front for opponents of abortion. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas has granted two preliminary
injunctions against fetal remains disposition requirements—one in
January 2017 with respect to regulations that DSHS ultimately adopted
and another about a year later with respect to a June 2017 Texas statute
that codified the substance of the DSHS regulations.6 In addition, the
preliminary injunction that the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana had issued with respect to the Indiana law
became permanent in September 2017, and in April 2018, the United
Woman’s Health, the first draft of the proposed [modifications to Texas regulations governing the
disposition of fetal remains] was published.”).
3. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, June Med. Servs. LLC v. Gee,
No. 16-CV-444/BAJ-RLB (M.D. La. July 1, 2016) (asserting that Louisiana’s fetal remains
disposition requirement is unconstitutional).
4. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, 194 F. Supp. 3d 818, 825, 834
(S.D. Ind. 2016) (enjoining an Indiana fetal remains disposition requirement that was set to go
into effect on July 1, 2016); Molly Redden, Texas Measure Requiring Burial of Fetal Remains
May Herald a New Wave of Similar Laws, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/19/texas-fetal-remains-burial-cremation-law
(indicating that then-Governor Mike Pence had signed Indiana’s law).
5. Redden, supra note 4. For the sake of simplicity, this Article uses the term “fetal
remains” to refer to all remains subject to the disposition requirements. The disposition
requirements in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas, however, apply even to remains from an abortion
that occurs before a fetus has developed. See IND. CODE § 16-18-2-128.7 (West 2016) (defining a
“fetus” as “an unborn child, irrespective of gestational age or the duration of the pregnancy”); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.9(9) (West 2018) (defining an “unborn child” or “fetus” as “the unborn
offspring of human beings from the moment of conception through pregnancy and until live
birth”); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.132 (West 2018) (defining fetal tissue as “[a] fetus, body parts,
or organs from a pregnancy”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 697.002 (West 2017)
(defining “embryonic and fetal tissue remains” as “an embryo, a fetus, body parts, or organs from
a pregnancy that terminates in the death of the embryo or fetus and for which the issuance of a
fetal death certificate is not required by state law”).
6. Compare 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1.136–1.137 (West 2018), with TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 697.002–796.004, 697.008 (West 2017). See 2017 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
441 (West 2017) (establishing requirements for the disposition of fetal remains); Hellerstedt II,
231 F. Supp. 3d at 233 (granting a preliminary injunction against the Texas regulations);
Hellerstedt II, No. A-16-CA-1300, 2018 BL 30317, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter
Hellerstedt II (order)] (enjoining the Texas statute).
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States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
decision.7
The Texas district court in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
(Hellerstedt II) and the Seventh Circuit in Planned Parenthood of Indiana
and Kentucky, Inc. v. Commissioner (PPINK) were united in the view that
a fetal remains disposition requirement cannot be justified based on what
Roe v. Wade had recognized as the state’s “important and legitimate”
interest in protecting potential life8 because the requirement applies after
an abortion is completed, when no potential life remains.9 But the courts
differed as to why injunctive relief was appropriate. While the Hellerstedt
II court concluded that DSHS’s regulations and the Texas statute were
unlikely to survive the undue burden standard adopted in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and later interpreted
by the Hellerstedt I Court,10 the court in PPINK struck down Indiana’s
fetal remains disposition law as an “arbitrary deprivation[] of liberty”
rather than an undue burden.11 Both courts parted company with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which in Planned
Parenthood of Minnesota v. Minnesota—before the Casey Court
abandoned the rigorous post-Roe trimester framework in favor of the
more forgiving undue burden standard—upheld a Minnesota fetal
remains disposition requirement that looks much like the ones at issue in
Hellerstedt II and PPINK.12 Thus, three federal courts have now
7. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859, 873 (S.D.
Ind. 2017), aff’d, 888 F.3d 300, 310 (7th Cir. 2018) [hereinafter PPINK] (permanently enjoining
Indiana’s fetal remains disposition requirement).
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
9. See PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308 (“[S]tate and federal fetal homicide statutes, as well as state
wrongful death statutes … seek to address a valid state interest in promoting respect for potential
life. The fetal disposition provisions differ because there is no potential life at stake.”); Hellerstedt
II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (“While the Supreme Court has acknowledged the State has an
‘important and legitimate interest[ ] . . . in protecting the potentiality of human life [,]’ the
Amendments do not further such a legitimate state interest [because they] regulate
activities . . . that occur when there is no potential life to protect.”); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018
BL 30317, at *6 (“[T]here is no precedent showing expressing respect for the unborn by restricting
[embryonic and fetal tissue remains] disposal after the potential for life no long exists is a valid
state interest.”).
10. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 228, 232 (explaining Hellerstedt I’s application
of Casey’s undue burden standard and determining that the Texas regulations governing the
disposition of fetal remains likely violated that standard); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317,
at *5 (“As recently confirmed by the Supreme Court, courts are to apply the ‘undue burden’
standard when evaluating potential restrictions on abortion access.” (citing Hellerstedt I)).
11. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 307.
12. See Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Minn., 910 F.2d 479, 481 n.2 (8th Cir. 1990)
(upholding a Minnesota statute requiring remains from an abortion or miscarriage to be disposed
of “by cremation, interment by burial, or in a manner directed by the commissioner of health);
infra notes 65–75 and accompanying text (discussing Casey and Roe’s trimester framework).
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expressed divergent views as to the constitutionality of similar fetal
remains disposition requirements. Given this split, the Supreme Court
may need to weigh in—again.13
This Article analyzes whether fetal remains disposition requirements
like those recently adopted in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas
unconstitutionally infringe on the right to choose that the Court first
recognized in Roe.14 Part I of this Article discusses the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in Planned Parenthood of Minnesota and recounts other preCasey challenges to measures governing the disposition of fetal remains.
Part II turns to Casey and Hellerstedt I and offers an in-depth analysis of
what Hellerstedt I’s interpretation of Casey’s undue burden test means
for abortion regulations designed to advance the state’s substantial
interest in protecting potential life. Part III then critically examines the
recent challenges to the Indiana and Texas fetal remains disposition
requirements in PPINK and Hellerstedt II. After describing the reasoning
that the Seventh Circuit and the Texas district court employed, Part III
explains the serious missteps the two courts made. Among other things,
Part III contends that both courts went off course by failing to appreciate
the relationship between Hellerstedt I, Casey, and Gonzales v. Carhart,15
the Court’s 2007 decision upholding the federal partial-birth abortion
ban, and the way in which fetal remains disposition requirements serve
the government’s interest in protecting potential life notwithstanding
their direct application to fetuses who no longer have that potential. Part
III concludes by evaluating how Louisiana’s fetal remains disposition
statute stands up to constitutional challenge.16
13. Alexandra Zavis, The Latest Battlefront in the Abortion Wars: Some States Want to
Require Burial or Cremation for Fetuses, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-aborted-fetus-burial-2017-story.html [https://perma.cc/B5BQ-2YHL] (“[L]egal
battles over the new regulations are likely to be long and could wind up before the Supreme
Court.” (citing a Wake Forest University law professor)).
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (“We . . . conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision . . . .”). This Article considers the constitutionality of new laws that restrict the
methods that may be used to dispose of fetal remains. It does not address the validity of laws that
regulate other aspects of the disposition of fetal remains without altering the permissible
disposition methods. For example, this Article does not give detailed attention to recent Arkansas
legislation that dictates who may direct the final disposition of a dead fetus. See 2017 Ark. Acts
603 (amending ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-801(b)(1)(B) to require the disposition of a dead fetus
in accordance with the Arkansas Final Disposition Rights Act of 2009). While the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted a preliminary injunction against the Arkansas
law under Casey’s undue burden test, it also indicated that the law “does not specify any new
method of disposal.” Hopkins v. Jegley, F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1069, 1104 (E.D. Ark. 2017).
15. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (upholding the federal partial-birth
abortion ban).
16. The defendants in the Louisiana action agreed not to enforce that state’s fetal disposition
requirement pending a ruling by the United States District Court for the Middle District of
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This Article concludes that, although Hellerstedt I was a setback for
abortion opponents, states continue to have broad latitude to adopt
abortion regulations aimed at protecting potential life and, consequently,
fetal remains disposition requirements like those adopted in Indiana and
Texas are apt to be upheld. States that adopt these requirements express
“profound respect for the life of the unborn”17 by proclaiming that what
is now dead was, at one time, a living human being. To be sure, this
proclamation comes too late to protect fetuses to whom the requirements
directly apply, but the very existence of the requirements delivers a
message that might persuade some women to choose childbirth over
abortion.18 And even after Hellerstedt I, that is enough.
I. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF MINNESOTA AND OTHER PRE-CASEY
CHALLENGES TO FETAL REMAINS DISPOSITION REGULATIONS
Regulations governing the disposition of fetal remains are not new.
Less than two years after the Court handed down Roe,19 Pennsylvania
enacted a statute requiring its Department of Health to “make regulations
to provide for the humane disposition of dead fetuses.”20 In Planned
Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick,21 a decision the Supreme Court affirmed
without opinion,22 the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania upheld the law against a facial challenge, deciding that a
state can exercise its police power to regulate the disposition of fetuses in
a manner designed to protect public health. 23 Pennsylvania persuaded the
court that it sought only “to preclude the mindless dumping of aborted
fetuses on to garbage piles,”24 and while the court rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that the fetal remains disposition statute unconstitutionally
burdened a woman’s right to choose by allowing health department
regulations that might place financial and psychological burdens on
Louisiana on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, and the district court has not yet
rendered a decision. See Joint Stipulation for Non-Enforcement as to Plaintiffs and Proposed
Order, at 1, June Med. Servs. LLC v. Gee, 136 S. Ct. 1354 (2016) (No. 16-CV-00444/BAJ-RLB)
(including the defendants’ agreement not to enforce Louisiana’s fetal remains disposition statute).
17. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
18. See id. at 877–78 (indicating that unless it represents a substantial obstacle to a woman’s
“right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will
be upheld if reasonably related to that goal”).
19. See Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 599 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(indicating that the Pennsylvania requirement was enacted on September 10, 1974).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 428 U.S. 901, 901 (1976).
23. See Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. at 573 (rejecting the facial challenge to Pennsylvania’s
fetal remains statute).
24. Id.
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women seeking first or second trimester abortions and might require
“treating the fetus as a human,”25 the court did not foreclose a later
challenge to the extent that an underlying regulation would “invade the
privacy of [a] pregnant woman and burden her decision concerning
abortion.”26
Just a few years later, in Margaret S. v. Edwards,27 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana found that a Louisiana
statute did just that.28 The statute at issue in Edwards directed abortion
doctors to ensure that fetal remains were disposed of in accordance with
the state’s laws governing the disposition of human remains in general—
laws which required that the remains of a deceased child be “decently
interred or cremated” and that the child’s parents choose between the
two.29 According to the Edwards court, Louisiana’s fetal remains
disposition statute unconstitutionally burdened a woman’s right to choose
abortion by “requir[ing] that fetal remains be treated with the same
dignity as the remains of a person.”30 In reaching its decision, the court
insisted that Roe barred Louisiana from deciding when life begins and
that asking a woman to choose the method of disposition creates
psychological burdens because the “question equates the abortion process
with the taking of a human life.”31 Moreover, the court speculated,
because Louisiana law gave both parents the right to direct the disposition
of a deceased child’s remains, the challenged fetal remains disposition
requirement might burden the abortion decision by requiring a woman to
consult with the aborted fetus’s father.32
In Leigh v. Olson,33 on the other hand, the United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota found a North Dakota statute similar to
the one at issue in Fitzpatrick to be rationally related to the state’s
legitimate interest in protecting public health and therefore facially
valid.34 The court also determined, however, that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied, because regulations adopted under statutory
authority required a woman or her “next of kin” to direct the manner of
25. Id. at 572.
26. Id. at 573.
27. 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
28. See id. at 223 (striking down a Louisiana fetal remains disposition requirement).
29. Id. at 221–22 (describing the effect of Louisiana’s fetal remains disposition
requirement).
30. Id. at 222.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 222 n.132 (discussing the potential effect of the father’s involvement).
33. 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1351 (D.N.D. 1980).
34. The North Dakota law required that a fetus “be disposed of in a humane fashion under
regulations adopted by the state department of health.” Leigh, 497 F. Supp. at 1351 (finding the
North Dakota Statute facially constitutional).
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disposal of an aborted fetus.35 According to the court, requiring a woman
to choose the manner of disposal directly burdened her decision to have
an abortion and did not advance the state’s interest in protecting potential
life or its interest in safeguarding maternal health.36
Like the district court in Olson, the Supreme Court in City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.37 faced a fetal remains
disposition requirement similar to the Pennsylvania statute upheld in
Fitzpatrick. This time, the Court struck down the requirement as facially
invalid.38 The Court, though, did not find that the requirement imposed
an impermissible burden on a woman’s right to choose abortion, but
concluded instead that it was unconstitutionally vague.39
The measure at issue in Akron was a city ordinance that required the
disposition of fetal remains “in a humane and sanitary manner,” but
unlike the statute in Fitzpatrick, the ordinance imposed criminal penalties
for violations.40 In deciding that the ordinance was unconstitutional, the
Court indicated that the word “humane” might suggest an “intent to
‘mandate some sort of “decent burial” of an embryo at the earliest stages
of formation[,]’”41 and that, because violations gave rise to criminal
sanctions, the Constitution would not tolerate the uncertainty that the
language created.42 Nevertheless, the Court indicated in a footnote that
“Akron remain[ed] free … to enact more carefully drawn regulations that
further its legitimate interest in proper disposal of fetal remains.”43
After suffering defeat in Edwards, Louisiana adopted what it may
have thought was a “more carefully drawn” fetal remains disposition
requirement. According to the district court in Margaret S. v. Treen,44
however, the new law still fell short of constitutional standards. 45 Rather
than forcing abortion doctors in all cases to treat fetal remains in the same
manner as the state required for other human remains,46 the new statute
directed a physician performing an abortion for a woman to notify her
35. See id. at 1352 (finding the North Dakota statute “unconstitutional as applied”).
36. See id. at 1351.
37. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
38. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 452 (determining that an Akron ordinance was invalid).
39. See id. at 451 (affirming the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit that the Akron ordinance was unconstitutionally vague).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 451 n.44.
43. Id. at 451 n.45.
44. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984).
45. See id. at 671 (“[I]t is this Court’s holding that [the fetal remains disposition law] is
unconstitutional.”).
46. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of the statute struck
down in Edwards).
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(within 24 hours after the abortion) of the requirements of law regarding
disposal of the “remains of the child”47 and, based on the Treen court’s
reading, mandated disposition of the fetus by burial or cremation if the
woman so chose.48
The new Louisiana statute, the court in Treen determined, raised a
host of problems. First, the court indicated that by requiring a woman to
be notified regarding how “the remains of the child” were to be disposed
of, the statute impermissibly equated a fetus with a born human person.49
Second, the court contended that the law imposed “psychological
burdens” on women by suggesting that the state “equates abortion with
the taking of a human life” and that it did not matter that a woman would
not be provided with information about disposition of the fetus until after
her abortion had been completed.50 Third, the court added, the disposition
requirement interfered with the physician–patient relationship because it
required a physician to inform a woman about the disposition of fetal
remains even if the physician judged that providing the information
would be harmful to the woman.51 Finally, the court concluded that
neither an interest in protecting public health nor an interest in respecting
the rights of patients who had particular views about the disposition of
fetal remains was “sufficiently compelling” to justify the Louisiana
statute’s burdens.52 In fact, according to the Treen court, the statute
served “no state interest whatsoever.”53
Unlike the Louisiana statute at issue in Treen, the Minnesota fetal
remains disposition requirement that the Eighth Circuit upheld in
Planned Parenthood of Minnesota—and that is still in place today—does
not require a woman who has an abortion to be involved in the disposition
of the aborted fetus’s remains.54 Instead, the Minnesota law simply
provides that health care facilities must dispose of the remains from
abortions and miscarriages by means of “cremation, interment by burial,
or in a manner directed by the commissioner of health.”55 This
requirement, the Eighth Circuit concluded, satisfies constitutional norms
because it is reasonably related to the state’s “interest in protecting public
47. Treen, 597 F. Supp. at 668–69.
48. See id. at 669 (presuming that the requirement that fetal remains be treated in the same
manner as other remains would arise “at the behest of the woman”).
49. Id. at 670.
50. Id. at 670–71.
51. Id. at 671.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Minn., 910 F.2d 479, 486–87 (8th Cir. 1990) (“The
woman need not be told of the disposition means, and indeed, she need not be consulted about the
particular provider’s choice for disposition.”).
55. Id. at 481 n.2.
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sensibilities,” an interest Planned Parenthood acknowledged as
legitimate.56
Notably, the Eighth Circuit determined that the Minnesota statute
“d[id] not burden the abortion choice” and therefore was not subject to
review as an abortion regulation.57 In reaching this decision, the court
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that increased costs resulting from the
Minnesota statute and related adverse psychological effects on women
represented impermissible burdens.58 As to costs, the Eighth Circuit
observed that the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood Association of
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft59 had concluded that an increase in
costs of up to $19.40 per patient did not give rise to an unconstitutional
burden, and the evidence indicated that the increase resulting from the
Minnesota statute would be far less.60 In addition, the court decided that
the Minnesota law does not impose a “psychological burden” on women
because it does not require a woman’s input in connection with the
disposition of fetal remains.61 Moreover, the court dismissed Planned
Parenthood’s suggestion that Minnesota intended to convey through the
statute the state’s view that “fetal remains are the equivalent of human
remains.”62 According to the court, even if this were the purpose, the
legislation would stand because “[a] state may make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion.”63
Having decided that the Minnesota statute does not burden a woman’s
ability to choose abortion, the Eighth Circuit then turned to the district
56. Id. at 487–88. By citing Maher v. Roe, Harris v. McRae, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery, and Plyler v. Doe, the court appears to have applied rational basis review in reaching
this conclusion. See Planned Parenthood of Minn., 910 F.2d at 486, 487–88 (citing Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980); Minn. v. Clover Leaf
Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). The court
also cites Akron and Ashcroft, however, each of which employs a standard of review that is not
so deferential. See Planned Parenthood of Minn., 910 F.2d at 486, 487 (citing Akron, 462 U.S. at
429, and Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 489–90); Akron, 462 U.S. at 430 (noting that, in previously
upholding abortion regulations that did not have a significant impact on a woman’s ability to
choose abortion, “[t]he decisive factor was that the State met its burden of demonstrating that
the[] regulations furthered important health-related State interests”); Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 489–
90 (balancing the burdens and benefits of an abortion regulation).
57. The Eighth Circuit suggested that, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490 (1989), the Supreme Court may have jettisoned strict scrutiny in favor of “a less rigorous
standard of review” for abortion regulations. Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, 910 F.2d at 486.
58. Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, 910 F.2d at 486–87.
59. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
60. Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, 910 F.2d at 487.
61. See id. at 486–87 (“The woman need not be told of the disposition means, and indeed,
she need not be consulted about the particular provider’s choice for disposition.”).
62. Id. at 487.
63. Id. (citing Webster, 492 U.S. at 506).
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court’s conclusion that the law could not survive even deferential rational
basis review because it was both underinclusive and overinclusive.64 The
law’s failure to address abortions or miscarriages in which a fetus is
delivered outside a health care facility, the court indicated, did not make
the law impermissibly underinclusive because regulating activity inside
the home raises “privacy concerns.”65 Furthermore, the court rejected the
claim that the statute was overinclusive, explaining that, to advance its
interest in protecting public sensibilities, the state could reasonably have
decided to include both miscarriages and abortions because they both
result in the delivery of fetal remains requiring disposal.66 Therefore, the
court decided, Minnesota’s fetal remains disposition requirement “fall[s]
within the permissible boundaries” the Supreme Court had established.67
II. THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD AND THE STATE’S INTEREST IN
PROTECTING POTENTIAL LIFE
A. Casey and Hellerstedt I
When the Eighth Circuit confirmed Minnesota’s right to prefer
childbirth over abortion, it relied on the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services68 and expressed a principle
that would later feature prominently in Casey.69 But to understand why
the Casey Court emphasized this principle, one must first return to Roe.
The Court in Roe recognized three interests that may justify regulating
abortion: an interest in maintaining standards for the medical profession,
an interest in safeguarding maternal health, and an interest in protecting

64. See id. (“The district court . . . concluded that . . . [the statute] was not rationally related
to any legitimate governmental interest.”).
65. Id. at 488.
66. See id. (discussing the district court’s conclusion that the statute is overinclusive).
67. Id.
68. 492 U.S. 490 (1989); see Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, 910 F.2d.at 487 (citing
Webster, 492 U.S. at 506).
69. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (“‘[T]he
Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a
preference for normal childbirth.’”) (quoting Webster, 492 U.S. at 511); id. at 878 (“[A] state
measure designed to persuade [a woman] to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if
reasonably related to that goal.”); id. (“[M]easures designed to advance [the State’s profound
interest in potential life] will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman
to choose childbirth over abortion.”); id. at 883 (“[W]e permit a State to further its legitimate goal
of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is
mature and informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over
abortion.”); id. at 886 (“[U]nder the undue burden standard a State is permitted to enact persuasive
measures which favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures do not further a health
interest.”).
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potential life.70 Those interests—and the Court’s view of their strength at
various points during pregnancy—served as the basis for the familiar
trimester framework that courts used to assess abortion regulations during
the period following Roe.71 Under that framework,
almost no regulation at all [was] permitted during the first
trimester of pregnancy; regulations designed to protect the
woman’s health, but not to further the State’s interest in
potential life, [were] permitted during the second trimester;
and during the third trimester, when the fetus is viable,
prohibitions [were] permitted provided the life or health of
the mother is not at stake.72
The trimester framework applied for almost 20 years, until the Casey
Court rejected it as inconsistent “with the holding in Roe itself” because
it undervalued a state’s interest in protecting potential life,73 an interest
Roe recognizes as “important and legitimate” and Casey describes as
“substantial” and “profound.”74 Accordingly, while the Court in Casey
retained viability as the point at which a state’s ability to regulate abortion
is the most robust,75 it abandoned the “rigid” trimester framework76 and
adopted an “undue burden” standard for abortion regulations that apply
before viability.77 In minting this new standard, the Court explained:
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose
is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further
the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the
woman’s free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which,
while furthering the interest in potential life or some other
valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be
considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate
ends. . . . Unless it has that effect . . ., a state measure
70. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (identifying government interests in regulating abortion).
71. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (discussing Roe’s trimester framework).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 876 (“Before viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat all governmental
attempts to influence a woman’s decision on behalf of the potential life within her as unwarranted.
This treatment is, in our judgment, incompatible with the recognition that there is a substantial
state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.”).
74. Id. at 875–76, 878 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 162).
75. Id. at 872.
76. Id. at 873.
77. See id. at 876 (“[T]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling
the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”).
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designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion
will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. Regulations
designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion
are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.78
Applying the undue burden standard, the Court upheld nearly every
aspect of the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey, including informed
consent provisions, a 24-hour waiting period, a parental consent
requirement, and reporting and recordkeeping requirements.79 The only
provisions that the Court struck down were those with respect to spousal
notification.80
Nearly 25 years later in Hellerstedt I, a Texas statute did not fare quite
so well. Under the statute, Texas had required (1) a physician performing
an abortion to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of
the facility in which the abortion was to be performed and (2) abortion
facilities to comply with standards applicable to ambulatory surgery
centers operating in the state.81 The Court struck down both
requirements.82 In so doing, the Court indicated that
“Casey . . . requires . . . courts [to] consider the burdens a law imposes on
abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer
[and] . . . whether any burden imposed on abortion access is “undue.” 83
The Court added that evaluating abortion regulations requires a more
searching review than applies under a traditional rational basis standard,
which calls for nothing more than a “reasonably conceivable state of
facts” that might support the regulation.84 Furthermore, according to the
Court, when subjected to a more demanding review, Texas’s admitting
privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements did not measure
up to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
78. Id. at 877–78.
79. See id. at 887, 899, 900 (concluding that various Pennsylvania abortion regulations are
constitutional).
80. See id. at 898, 901 (invalidating Pennsylvania spousal notification provisions and a
related reporting requirement).
81. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (Hellerstedt I), 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016)
(describing the provisions of the Texas statute at issue in the case).
82. Id. at 2300.
83. Id. at 2309–10.
84. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). The Court in Hellerstedt I rebuked U.S. Court
of Appeals for applying the traditional rational basis standard normally applicable to economic
regulations such as those at issue in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. See Hellerstedt I, 136
U.S. at 2309 (“And the second part of the test [the Fifth Circuit used] is wrong to equate the
judicial review applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with
the less strict review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue.” (citing
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)). The Court in Williamson
explained that “it [was] for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages” of the law at issue in the case. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487.
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As to any benefits associated with the Texas law, the Court noted that
Texas’s admitting privileges requirement was intended to make abortion
safer by facilitating access to a hospital if a woman has complications
from the procedure.85 The record, the Court insisted, indicated that the
requirement offered no significant benefit in this regard.86 In particular,
the Court cited expert testimony and other evidence suggesting that
abortion is “extremely safe” in Texas, and the Court observed that Texas
had not shown that the admitting privileges requirement “would have
helped even one woman obtain better treatment.”87 Indeed, the Court
stated that it “found nothing . . . that show[ed] that . . . the [requirement]
advanced Texas’ legitimate interest in protecting women’s health.”88
On the other hand, the Court concluded that the admitting privileges
requirement imposed significant burdens on women seeking abortions.89
In reaching that conclusion, the Court credited evidence that, around the
time the admitting privileges requirement went into effect, approximately
20 abortion facilities closed, thereby decreasing access to abortion and
creating other adverse consequences: “In our view, the record contains
sufficient evidence that the admitting-privileges requirement led to the
closure of half of Texas’[s] clinics, or thereabouts. Those closures meant
fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding.”90 The
Court observed that the closures also resulted in greater driving distances
for women seeking abortions, and while the Court “recognize[d] that
increased driving distances do not always constitute an ‘undue burden,’”
it found that they were “but one additional burden, which, when taken
together with others . . . and when viewed in light of the virtual absence
of any health benefit, . . . support[ed] the District Court’s ‘undue burden’
conclusion.”91
The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to Texas’s
ambulatory surgery center requirement.92 Highlighting evidence
indicating that abortion is safer than other procedures that are not required
to be performed in an ambulatory surgery center, the Court found “that
the surgical-center provision impose[d] ‘a requirement that simply is not
85. Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2311.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2311–12.
88. Id. at 2311.
89. Id. at 2312 (“At the same time, the record evidence indicates that the admittingprivileges requirement places a ‘substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice.’” (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992))).
90. Id. at 2313.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 2318 (“[T]he surgical-center requirement . . . provides few, if any, health
benefits for women, poses a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions, and constitutes an
‘undue burden.’”).
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based on differences’ between abortion and other surgical procedures
‘that are reasonably related to’ preserving women’s health, the asserted
‘purpos[e] of the Act in which it is found.’”93 Moreover, the Court
emphasized that the record offered “sufficient support for the more
general conclusion that the surgical-center requirement ‘will not
[provide] better care or . . . more frequent positive outcomes.’”94
In addition, just as with the admitting privileges provision, the Court
found that the ambulatory surgery center requirement imposed
disproportionate burdens on abortion access. Of particular concern to the
Court was the stipulated fact that the ambulatory surgery center
requirement would increase the number of abortion facility closures even
more, leaving the state with only seven or eight such facilities.95 As to the
closures, the Court endorsed the district court’s reliance on a single expert
who testified that it was unlikely that the remaining facilities would be
able to meet the demand for abortion services.96 Furthermore, the Court
cited “common sense” that existing facilities designed to meet a certain
level of demand will not be able to meet five times that level of demand
“without expanding or otherwise incurring significant costs.”97 And again
the Court pointed out possible collateral effects that could result from
clinic closures—even if remaining facilities could meet demand:
Texas seeks to force women to travel long distances to get
abortions
in
crammed-to-capacity
superfacilities.
Patients . . . are less likely to get the kind of individualized
attention, serious conversation, and emotional support that
doctors
at
less
taxed
facilities
may
have
offered. . . . Surgical centers attempting to accommodate
sudden, vastly increased demand may find that quality of
care declines.98
Thus, with “few, if any, health benefits for women,” the Court
concluded that the “the surgical-center requirement, like the admittingprivileges requirement, . . . pose[d] a substantial obstacle to women
seeking abortions, and constitute[d] an “undue burden” on their
constitutional right to do so.”99

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 2315.
Id. at 2316.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2317.
Id. at 2318.
Id.
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B. Placing the State’s Interest in Protecting Potential Life on the Scale
In reaching its decision in Hellerstedt I, the Court assumed that
Texas’s admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements
were aimed at protecting maternal health100 and not at either of the other
governmental interests (protecting potential life and maintaining medical
standards) that the Court in Roe identified.101 As a result, it is unclear as
to whether and how the balancing test found in Hellerstedt I might apply
to regulations—like fetal remains disposition requirements—that
advance the state’s “substantial interest in potential life.”102 What is clear,
however, is that the Court in Hellerstedt I did not overrule Casey or
Gonzales, but merely interpreted Casey’s undue burden standard.103
Thus, when considering measures designed to serve the state’s interest in
protecting potential life, one must look to how the Court in Casey treated
those parts of the Pennsylvania statute sustained based on that interest
and what led the Court in Gonzales to uphold the federal partial-birth
abortion ban.
Notably, in concluding that Casey’s undue burden standard is a
balancing test, the Court in Hellerstedt I only cited the Casey Court’s
analysis regarding the spousal notification and parental consent
provisions that were at issue.104 And Casey’s discussion of neither
provision focuses on the state’s interest in protecting potential life.
Instead, to the extent that the Casey Court was balancing the benefits and
burdens of these provisions, it was considering other interests.
With respect to the Pennsylvania spousal notification provision, the
Court in Casey considered the benefits to the husband and his interest in
potential life against the burdens the notification requirement imposed on
his wife.105 In addition, the Casey Court relied on Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth,106 a case in which it had considered a
spousal consent requirement relative to “the interest of the state in
protecting the mutuality of decisions vital to the marriage

100. See id. at 2310 (“[O]ne is left to infer that the legislature sought to further a
constitutionally acceptable objective (namely, protected women’s health).”).
101. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (listing the governmental interests Roe
recognized).
102. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
103. See Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (“We must here decide whether two provisions of
Texas’ House Bill 2 violate the Federal Constitution as interpreted in Casey.”).
104. See id. at 2309 (describing Casey’s undue burden test as a balancing test).
105. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 896–98 (noting the husband’s interest and indicating that the
Court held in Danforth that “the balance weighs in [the wife’s] favor”).
106. Id. at 897 (“The principles that guided the Court in Danforth should be our guides
today.”).
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relationship.”107 In Danforth, of course, the Court would not have given
any weight to the state’s interest in protecting potential life because the
consent requirement applied during the first trimester of pregnancy, the
period in which Roe’s trimester framework demanded that “the abortion
decision and its effectuation . . . be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman’s attending physician.”108
Casey’s treatment of Pennsylvania’s parental consent requirement
similarly involves no consideration of the state’s interest potential life.109
107. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. V. Danforth, 392 F. Supp 1362, 1370 (E.D. Mo. 1975)).
108. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 60 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164). Roe suggests that only in the
third trimester does the state’s interest in protecting potential life become strong enough to serve
as a basis for abortion regulation. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65 (“For the stage subsequent to
viability the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses,
regulate . . . abortion.”). It was not until 1992 that the Court in Casey abandoned this far-reaching
prohibition, concluding that Roe’s “essential holding” was that the state’s interest in protecting
potential life is not strong enough to justify pre-viability regulations that impose a substantial
obstacle on the ability of a woman to choose abortion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (“Before
viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the
imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.”).
109. In setting out “guiding principles” for the undue burden standard, the Court in Casey
indicated that a state may “create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or
guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn . . . , if [the mechanism
is] not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.” Casey, 505 U.S. at
877. But neither those “guiding principles” nor Casey’s specific consideration of Pennsylvania’s
parental consent requirement indicates that such a requirement is justified based on the state’s
interest in potential life.
Moreover, when evaluating parental consent and notification requirements, the Court and
individual justices have historically focused on the state’s interests in protecting the integrity of
the family, protecting pregnant minors, and protecting the interests of parents. See Akron, 497
U.S. at 520 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (concluding that an Ohio parental consent statute did not
pose an undue burden on a minor’s ability to choose abortion and indicating that “[i]t would deny
all dignity to the family to say that the State cannot take this reasonable step in regulating its
health professions . . . .”); Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“Three separate but
related interests—the interest in the welfare of the pregnant minor, the interest of the parents, and
the interest of the family unit—are relevant to our consideration of the constitutionality of the 48–
hour waiting period and the two-parent notification requirement.”); Akron, 462 U.S. at 439 (“In
Bellotti . . . , a majority of the Court indicated that a State’s interest in protecting immature minors
will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either parental or judicial.”); Planned
Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1983) (“A State’s
interest in protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either
parental or judicial.”); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) (“As applied to immature and
dependent minors, the statute plainly serves the important considerations of family integrity and
protecting adolescents . . . . In addition, . . . the statute serves a significant state interest by
providing an opportunity for parents to supply essential medical and other information to a
physician.”); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 648 (“There is . . . an important state interest in encouraging a
family rather than a judicial resolution of a minor’s abortion decision.”); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (“One suggested interest is the safeguarding of the
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In fact, contrary to what Hellerstedt I suggests, Casey evidences no real
balancing of the benefits and burdens of the parental consent requirement
at all. In fact, the Court’s opinion in Casey did little more than affirm that
the judicial bypass provisions in the Pennsylvania statute fit within the
parameters the Court had employed in prior opinions: “We have been
over most of this ground before. Our cases establish, and we reaffirm
today, that a state may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the
consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial
bypass procedure.”110
Because the Court in Hellerstedt I cited only Casey’s treatment of the
Pennsylvania spousal notification and parental consent requirements and
because, in analyzing those requirements, Casey does not consider the
state’s interest in protecting potential life, one might conclude that the
balancing test that Hellerstedt I employed is inapplicable when a
regulation is designed to serve the state’s interest in potential life.111 But
Casey’s analysis of the spousal notification and parental consent
provisions makes no mention of the state’s interest in maternal health
family unit and of parental authority.”). While the district court in Hodgson determined that “the
legislature was motivated by a desire to deter and dissuade minors from choosing to terminate
their pregnancies,” Minnesota’s Attorney General disclaimed this purpose on appeal and the Court
did not consider it, noting that “the state judges who have interpreted the statute in over 3,000
decisions implementing its bypass procedures have found no legislative intent to disfavor the
decision to terminate a pregnancy.” Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 428, 436. And although the Court in
Matheson mentioned the state’s interest in protecting potential life, see Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413
(“[S]tate action ‘encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances’ is ‘rationally
related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life.’”), the plurality in
Casey did not cite Matheson anywhere in its opinion.
110. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899; see Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510–
19 (1990) (focusing on whether an Ohio judicial bypass provision satisfied constitutional
requirements); Hodgson v. Minn., 497 U.S. 417, 461 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (assessing
whether a Minnesota judicial bypass provision was constitutional); Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 497–
501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the constitutionality of a
judicial bypass provision); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
439–40 (1983) (analyzing whether an Akron ordinance allowed for judicial bypass), overruled in
part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979) (discussing
the judicial bypass requirement). Similar to Casey’s treatment of the Pennsylvania spousal
notification provision, the Court in Hodgson balanced the interests of a minor woman and one of
her parents against the interests of the other parent in connection with a parental notification
provision, see Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 453 (“[T]he combined for of the separate interest of one
parent and the minor’s privacy interest must outweigh the separate interest of the second parent.”),
but in analyzing the parental consent requirement in Casey, the Court does not cite the opinion of
the Court in Hodgson.
111. See, e.g., Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 228 (“According to DSHS, the Court should
not balance the benefits and burdens of regulations expressing respect for the life of the unborn.”);
Hopkins, F. Supp. 3d at 1055 (“Defendants contend that the balancing test . . . applies only when
‘the state’s interest is in . . . a patient’s health or safety’ and that the lesser standard of rational
basis review applies ‘when a state regulates to promote respect for unborn life.’”).
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either, and that interest was the focus in Hellerstedt I.112 Thus, deciding
how broadly the balancing test recognized in Hellerstedt I applies is a
challenge.113
What type of means-ends analysis the balancing test contemplates
also is elusive. Hellerstedt I unequivocally states that traditional,
deferential rational basis review is not the proper standard: “[I]t is wrong
to equate the judicial review [under the undue burden test] . . . with the
less strict review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is
at issue.”114 Hellerstedt also purports to apply Casey, though, and the
Court in Casey rejected strict scrutiny:
[C]ases [in the period following Roe] decided that any
regulation touching upon the abortion decision must survive
strict scrutiny, to be sustained only if drawn in narrow terms
to further a compelling state interest. Not all of the cases
decided under that formulation can be reconciled with the
holding in Roe itself that the State has legitimate interests in
the health of the woman and in protecting the potential life
within her.115

112. See Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 ([O]ne is left to infer that the legislature sought to
further a constitutionally acceptable objective (namely, protecting women’s health).”). Curiously,
the Court in Hellerstedt I did not cite Casey’s treatment of Pennsylvania’s recordkeeping and
reporting requirements, the only provisions of the Pennsylvania statute that the Casey Court
explicitly acknowledged as being designed to further the state’s interest in maternal health. See
Casey, 505 U.S. at 900 (“Although [the recordkeeping and reporting requirements] do not relate
to the State’s interest in informing the woman’s choice, they do relate to health.”).
113. Under the Court’s precedent, no judicial balancing test would be required if an abortion
regulation does not impose an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. See Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315, 326 (1980) (“The Hyde Amendment, like the Connecticut welfare
regulation at issue in Maher, places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses
to terminate her pregnancy, . . . . In making an independent appraisal of the competing interests
involved here, the District Court went beyond the judicial function. Such decisions are entrusted
under the Constitution to Congress, not the courts.”); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474, 479 (1977)
(“The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles . . . in the pregnant woman’s path to an
abortion . . . . Indeed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as those implicated by
public funding of nontherapeutic abortions, the appropriate forum for their resolution . . . is the
legislature.”).
114. Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2309.
115. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871. The Court in City of Akron applied strict scrutiny to strike down
an Akron ordinance regulating abortion, and in overruling City of Akron in part, the Court in Casey
referred to City of Akron as a case that errantly applied strict scrutiny. See id. at 882 (referring to
City of Akron as an example of the inappropriate application of strict scrutiny and overruling the
decision in City of Akron to strike down certain informed consent provisions); City of Akron, 462
U.S. at 427 (“[R]estrictive state regulation of the right to choose abortion, as with other
fundamental rights subject to searching judicial examination, must be supported by a compelling
state interest.”), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Moreover, neither the Court’s analysis in Hellerstedt I nor in Casey or
Gonzales contains the marks of strict scrutiny—which requires a
regulation to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest116—or of “intermediate” scrutiny—which requires that a
regulation bear a substantial relationship to an important or legitimate
government interest.117 Thus, to the extent that the balancing test
Hellerstedt I employs is broadly applicable, it would seem to be less
demanding than even intermediate scrutiny, but more rigorous than
deferential rational basis review. Unfortunately, the Court in Hellerstedt
I did not give any meaningful guidance as to how to apply the balancing
test in general or in any particular situation, leading Justice Clarence
Thomas to suggest in his Hellerstedt I dissent that application of the
undue burden standard “will surely mystify lower courts for years to
come.”118
But a couple of things are relatively certain. If Hellerstedt I means
that Casey’s undue burden standard requires balancing in all
circumstances,119 the Court in Casey and Gonzales necessarily employed
a balancing test when it sustained various regulations based on the
governmental interest in protecting potential life. And if that is so,
because Hellerstedt I does not address the interest in protecting potential

116. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (explaining the
requirements of strict scrutiny).
117. See id. at 441 (describing the requirements of intermediate scrutiny). Hellerstedt I refers
to the state’s “legitimate” interest in protecting maternal health, Gonzales describes the state’s
interest in protecting potential life as “legitimate” and “substantial” and its interest in maintaining
medical standards as “legitimate,” and Casey indicates that the state’s interest in protecting
potential life is “important,” “legitimate,” “substantial,” and “profound” and its interest in
protecting maternal health is “important” and “legitimate.” Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2309, 2311;
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145–46, 158 (2007); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 853, 870, 871,
875–76, 878, 882, 883. But neither Hellerstedt I nor Gonzales refer to any compelling interest nor
considers whether the regulations at issue are narrowly tailored or substantially related to the
relevant government’s interests. And the Court in Casey specifically rejected applying strict
scrutiny to abortion regulations and nowhere considered the substantiality of the relationship
between the Pennsylvania statute and the state’s interests. See supra note 113 and accompanying
text (indicating that Casey concluded that strict scrutiny was inconsistent with Roe). But see
Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s undue-burden test looks
far less like our post-Casey precedents and far more like the strict-scrutiny standard that Casey
rejected, under which only the most compelling rationales justified restrictions on abortion.”).
118. Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. This Article assumes, but does not conclude, that Hellerstedt I balancing always is
required under Casey’s undue burden standard. Given, however, that the Hellerstedt I Court
concluded that each of the Texas regulations represented a substantial obstacles to abortion access,
see supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing Hellerstedt I), one might reasonably
conclude that what the Court stated about balancing is mere dicta or only applies when a healthbased regulation poses a substantial obstacle.
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life at all, Casey and Gonzalesmust control how to weigh the benefits
and burdens of a measure that purports to serve that interest.
The Hellerstedt I Court’s rebuke of the Fifth Circuit for not
considering the medical benefits of Texas’s admitting privileges and
ambulatory surgery center requirements120 may tempt one to question
whether a pre-viability abortion regulation always must yield medical
benefits to satisfy the undue burden standard. Again, though, Hellerstedt
I did not overrule Casey,121 and the Court in Casey could not have been
clearer that a regulation seeking to protect potential life by informing a
woman’s choice need not offer any medical benefit: “[8@QGHUWKHXQGXH
EXUGHQ VWDQGDUG D 6WDWH LV SHUPLWWHG WR HQDFW SHUVXDVLYH PHDVXUHV
ZKLFK IDYRU FKLOGELUWK RYHU DERUWLRQ even if those measures do not
further a health interest”122
Thus, when a state regulates abortion pre-viability in a manner
designed to protect potential life—at least when it does so by adopting
measures to inform a woman’s decision—the state’s regulation need not
offer any medical benefits. On further inspection of both Casey and
Gonzales, in fact, one can see that the benefit required to satisfy the undue
burden test when an abortion regulation targets the interest in protecting
potential life is minimal. Indeed, both decisions indicate that, for a
regulation founded on that interest to withstand constitutional scrutiny, it
need only be conceivable that the regulation would cause a woman to
choose childbirth over abortion; the regulation’s constitutionality does
not depend on how likely it is that the regulation will achieve that end in
any particular case or any percentage of cases.
In various places, the language the Court used in Casey and Gonzales
validates this conclusion. For instance, in upholding Pennsylvania’s
informed consent provision, the Casey Court stated:
Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an
abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not
dispositive, to the decision. . . . We . . . see no reason why
the State may not require doctors to inform a woman seeking
an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the
consequences to the fetus. . . . [W]e permit a State to further
its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by
enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is
mature and informed . . . . In short, requiring that the woman
120. See Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2309
121. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
122. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886 (emphasis added); see also id.
at 886 (“We . . . see no reason why the State may not require doctors to inform a woman seeking
an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when
those consequences have no direct relation to her health.”) (emphasis added).
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be informed of the availability of information relating to
fetal development and the assistance available should she
decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable
measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might
cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.123
And with respect to the waiting period at issue in Casey, the Court
added: “The idea that important decisions will be more informed and
deliberate if they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as
unreasonable . . . In theory, at least, the waiting period is a reasonable
measure to implement the State’s interest in protecting the life of the
unborn . . . .”124 Simply put, these are not words that evidence a rigorous
assessment of whether a woman actually would, or even would be likely
to, decide against abortion ban based on the regulation.125
Gonzales is even clearer in this regard. In that case, the Court upheld
the federal partial-birth abortion merely on its intuition regarding the
effect abortion may have on an unspecified number of women: “While
we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to
123. Id. at 882–83 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 885.
125. In a number of places, the Court in Casey indicates that its decision to uphold aspects
of the Pennsylvania statute were made in reliance on the record in the case. See id. at 884–85
(“Since there is no evidence on this record that requiring a doctor to give the information as
provided by the statute would amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman
seeking an abortion, we conclude that it is not an undue burden.”); id. at 885 (“[T]he record
evidence shows that in the vast majority of cases, a 24–hour delay does not create any appreciable
health risk.”); id. at 887 (“[O]n the record before us, . . . we are not convinced that the 24–hour
waiting period constitutes an undue burden.”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 901 (“While at some point
increased cost could become a substantial obstacle, there is no such showing on the record before
us.”). Thus, one might contend that Casey leaves a window open for a plaintiff to present evidence
that an abortion regulation founded on the state’s interest in potential life is or will be ineffective
in causing women to choose childbirth over abortion. In each case in which the Court referred to
the record, however, it was discussing the obstacles or burdens the relevant provisions imposed,
not the potential benefits. See id. at 879–901. Moreover, one finds in Gonzales no evidence that
it was relying on the record in deciding that the federal partial-birth abortion ban advanced the
state’s interest in protecting potential life. Thus, the Casey Court’s references to the record should
not undermine the conclusion that a regulation intended to advance the state’s interest in
protecting prenatal life need only offer a conceivable benefit. In addition, even if the record were
relevant in determining that a benefit exists, with campaigns like Silent No More in which women
testify that they regret their abortions, it seems likely that the State would be able to offer evidence
to rebut a plaintiff’s assertion that a regulation would not cause a woman to choose childbirth over
abortion. See About Us, SILENT NO MORE AWARENESs, http://www.silentnomoreawareness.org/
about-us/ [https://perma.cc/4FAY-WTG6] (last visited Mar. 25, 2018); cf. Hellerstedt I, 136 S.
Ct. 2311–12 (“[W]hen directly asked at oral argument whether Texas knew of a single instance
in which the new requirement would have helped even one woman obtain better treatment, Texas
admitted that there was no evidence in the record of such a case.”).
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abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”126 Furthermore, the
Court relied on inference to conclude that the partial-birth abortion ban
furthers the state’s interest in protecting potential life:
It is a reasonable inference that a necessary effect of the
regulation and the knowledge it conveys will be to
encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus
reducing the absolute number of late-term abortions. . . . The
State’s interest in respect for life is advanced by the dialogue
that better informs the political and legal systems, the
medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a
whole of the consequences that follow from a decision to
elect a late-term abortion.127
In addition to the language the Court used in both Casey and Gonzales,
the nature of the regulations that the Court upheld in the two cases
confirms that to have a benefit sufficient to satisfy the undue burden test,
it need only be conceivable that a regulation designed to promote
childbirth could achieve that end. In Casey, for example, the Court
sustained a requirement that a woman be told about available information
regarding fetal development and resources available to a woman who
chooses not to terminate her pregnancy,128 even though the applicable
statute contained no requirement that a woman actually look at the
information. And in Gonzales, the Court deemed the federal partial-birth
abortion ban constitutional based on the information provided by the ban
itself 129 without considering whether any particular woman would know
of the ban then or in the future.
But perhaps the most compelling evidence of the low bar that applies
to regulations designed to further the state’s interest in protecting
potential life is found by comparing what the Hellerstedt I Court stated
when it struck down Texas’s admitting privileges and ambulatory
surgery center requirements to what Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg said
in objecting to the Gonzales Court’s decision to uphold the federal
partial-birth abortion ban. In striking down the ambulatory surgery
center requirement, the Court in Hellerstedt I reported: “record
evidence . . . provides ample support for the . . . conclusion that ‘[m]any
of the building standards mandated by the act and its implementing rules
have such a tangential relationship to patient safety in the context of
126. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
128. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883 (determining that Pennsylvania’s informed consent
requirements were constitutional).
129. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 133, 160, 168 (reversing decisions of appeals courts that
struck down the federal partial-birth abortion ban).
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abortion as to be nearly arbitrary.’”130 Likewise, with respect to the
admitting privileges requirements, the Court stressed: “[W]hen directly
asked at oral argument whether Texas knew of a single instance in which
the new requirement would have helped even one woman obtain better
treatment, Texas admitted that there was no evidence in the record of such
a case.”131
What Justice Ginsburg stated in her dissent in Gonzales is strikingly
similar: “The law saves not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets
only a method of performing abortion.”132 Yet, in Gonzales, a “reasonable
inference” about the federal partial-birth abortion ban’s effect and the
message it delivers offered “ample justification” for the ban—even in the
absence of ‘reliable data’ to support the conclusion that “some women
come to regret their choice to abort.”133 Thus, the measures at issue in
Casey and Gonzales and the language the Court used in those cases
(particularly when held up against the language found in Hellerstedt I)
attest to the fact that, if a regulation plausibly could cause a woman to
choose childbirth over abortion, the regulation’s benefit is sufficient to
satisfy Casey’s undue burden test.
With such a low bar for finding a sufficient benefit, the critical
constitutional question for an abortion regulation that serves the state’s
interest in protecting potential life becomes the degree to which the
regulation burdens women’s access to abortion. On this point, Casey is
once again instructive. In describing its undue burden test, the Court in
Casey explained: “What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the
ultimate decision . . . . Regulations which do no more than create a
structural mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound
respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial
obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”134 While the
Court acknowledged that increased costs could impose an impermissible
obstacle, those associated with Pennsylvania 24-hour waiting period and
reporting and recordkeeping requirements did not.135 Moreover, the
130. Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2316 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 2311–12 (emphasis added).
132. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 181 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); see id. at 160 (“It is objected that
the standard D & E is in some respects as brutal, if not more, than the intact D & E, so that the
legislation accomplishes little. What we have already said, however, shows ample justification
for the regulation.”).
133. Id. at 159, 160.
134. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
135. See id. at 886 (“We do not doubt that, as the District Court held, the waiting period has
the effect of ‘increasing the cost and risk of delay of abortions,’ . . . but the District Court did not
conclude that the increased costs and potential delays amount to substantial obstacles.”); id. at
901 (“While at some point increased cost could become a substantial obstacle, there is no such
showing on the record before us.”).
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Court determined that the waiting period did not “impose[] a real health
risk” and that the effect on women living significant distances away from
an abortion provider was not enough to invalidate the measure.136 In fact,
the only aspect of the Pennsylvania statute that the Court determined
unduly burdensome was the spousal notification requirement, which the
Court explained would operate as a practical ban on abortion for some
women.137
The collection of burdens that drove the Court in Hellerstedt I to strike
down Texas’s admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center
requirements arose from a consequence of perhaps greater magnitude—
large-scale abortion facility closures. According to the Court, the two
requirements, when taken together, would cause the number of abortion
facilities in the State to drop from approximately 40 to just 7 or 8.138 The
closures resulting from the admitting privileges requirement, the Court
decided, would impose substantial obstacles to abortion access because
they “meant fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased
crowding.”139 In addition, while acknowledging that increased driving
distances alone may not present a significant obstacle to abortion, the
Court stated that that burden was just one more to add to the mix.140 As
to the additional closures attendant to the ambulatory surgery center
requirement, the Court credited evidence and relied on “common sense”
to conclude that the remaining facilities would be unable to meet
demand141 and recited a litany of collateral consequences even if the
remaining facilities could accommodate additional women seeking
abortion services.142
Therefore, the consequences—an effective ban on abortion for a
particular population of women and an approximately 80% reduction in
136. See id. at 885–86 (discussing the delay imposed on women who lived some distance
away from an abortion provider). The Court in Gonzales likewise observed that an abortion
regulation would be unconstitutional if it “subject[ed] [women] to significant health risks.”
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 161.
137. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 (“[T]he significant number of women who fear for their
safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely
as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.”).
138. See Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2312, 2316 (2016) (noting that the district court had
determined that the admitting privileges requirement caused the number of facilities to drop “from
about 40 to about 20” and that the parties stipulated that the ambulatory surgery center
requirement would cause the number of facilities to decrease to seven or eight).
139. Id. at 2313.
140. See id. (indicating that the increased traveling distances were “but one additional
burden”).
141. Id. at 2317. See also id. at 2316–18 (finding the record sufficient to support the district
court’s conclusion regarding the ability to meet demand).
142. See id. at 2318 (indicating that a reduction in the number of available abortion facilities
could deprive women of “individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support”).
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the number of abortion facilities available—that drove the Court in Casey
and Hellerstedt I to strike down abortion regulations at issue in those
cases under the undue burden test were of significant scale. It is with this
in mind that one must evaluate fetal remains disposition requirements.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MODERN FETAL REMAINS
DISPOSITION REQUIREMENTS
Despite the substantial freedom that Casey and Gonzales offer, two
courts recently concluded that measures regulating the disposition of fetal
remains do not meet, or are unlikely to meet, the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In PPINK, the Seventh Circuit struck down an
Indiana statute providing that, if a woman having an abortion does not
exercise her right to determine how the aborted fetus is to be disposed of,
the facility in which the abortion is performed must ensure that the fetus
is interred or cremated separately from other tissue extracted during
surgery.143 And in Hellerstedt II, a Texas federal district court enjoined
amended Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) regulations
and a subsequently-enacted Texas statute, both of which reduced the
number of permissible means of disposing of tissue from abortions and
miscarriages, eliminating the least expensive options and permitting only
burial or cremation, regardless of the gestational age of the fetus.144
While both the Seventh Circuit and the Texas district court reached
similar conclusions, they got there in different ways. In PPINK, the court
did not even mention Casey’s undue burden test when evaluating
Indiana’s fetal remains disposition statute, but instead determined that the
statute could not survive the very deferential rational basis standard of
143. See PPINK, 888 F.3d at 303–04 (describing the effects of the Indiana statute). While
the Indiana statute does not allow a fetus to be cremated with other “surgical byproducts,” it does
allow for fetuses to be cremated collectively. Id. at 304.
144. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 223–25 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (describing the
amendments and their effect); see generally Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *1-2
(describing the Texas statute). The amended regulations state that the methods of disposition are
limited to “interment, incineration followed by interment, or steam disinfection followed by
interment,” and the definition of the term “interment” includes “‘the process of cremation
followed by placement of the ashes in a niche, grave, or scattering of ashes.”’ Hellerstedt II, 231
F. Supp. 3d at 224. While the provisions of both the DSHS regulations and the Texas statute
extend both to abortions and miscarriages, the regulations and statute only apply to fetal tissue
expelled or delivered at a health care facility. Hellestedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 224 (“[T]he
Amendments except ‘human tissue, including fetal tissue, that is expelled or removed . . . once
the person is outside of a healthcare facility.’”); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *2 (“[A]
Texas health care facility . . . must dispose of [embryonic and fetal tissue remains] passed or
delivered at the facility.”); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.138.3(c)(5) (West 2017) (exempting “human
tissue, including embryonic and fetal tissue, that is expelled or removed from the human body
once the person is outside of a health care facility”).
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review.145 The court in Hellerstedt II, in contrast, employed the undue
burden test as explained in Hellerstedt I and found that the Texas
regulations and statute likely fell short.146
A. PPINK
The parties in PPINK agreed that Indiana’s fetal remains disposition
requirement did not implicate a fundamental right and therefore was
subject to rational basis review, a standard that merely requires that a
challenged law “be rationally related to legitimate government
interests.”147 Under the rational basis standard, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof, and to be successful, she must prove that “there is [no]
conceivable state of facts that supports” the law.148 According to the
Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff had done so.149
In reaching its conclusion, the PPINK court determined that the state’s
purported interest in “‘the humane and dignified disposal of fetal
remains’”150 is not a legitimate one because a fetus is not a person for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.151 And the court rejected the
State’s argument that its interest must be legitimate because other state
and federal laws treat fetuses as “human beings.”152 Those other laws, the
court asserted, are designed to foster respect for potential life and “no
potential life [is] at stake” when Indiana’s fetal remains disposition
statute applies.153 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the State’s
argument that Gonzales recognized an interest in “fetal human dignity,”
noting that Gonzales “‘involved a ‘ban on abortions that involve partial
delivery of a living fetus.’”154
145. See PPINK, 888 F.3d at 309–10 (concluding that the Indiana statute is not rationally
related to any legitimate government interest).
146. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 227–32 (finding that the Texas regulations likely
fail the undue burden test); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *5 (finding that the Texas
statute likely fails the undue burden test).
147. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 307 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997)).
148. Id. at 308 (quoting Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Community Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d
569, 576 (7th Cir. 2014)). While the plaintiffs asserted both substantive due process and equal
protection claims, because the court determined that the law was invalid on due process grounds,
it did not consider the equal protection claims. See id. at 307–08.
149. See id. at 309 (“[W]e cannot identify a rational relationship between the State’s
interest . . . and the law as written . . . . Accordingly, the fetal disposition provisions violated
substantive due process.”).
150. Id. at 308.
151. See id. (“Simply put, the law does not recognize that an aborted fetus is a person. . . . As
such, the State’s interest in requiring abortion providers to dispose of aborted fetuses in the same
manner as human remains is not legitimate.”).
152. See id. at 308–10.
153. Id. at 308.
154. Id.
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The court also distinguished the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Planned
Parenthood of Minnesota, emphasizing that that court’s recognition of a
legitimate interest in “protecting public sensibilities” was mere dicta
because Planned Parenthood had conceded the interest’s legitimacy. 155
In addition, the Seventh Circuit insisted, the interest recognized in the
Eighth Circuit case was “meaningfully different” from the interest
Indiana cited in PPINK because the stated purpose of Minnesota’s fetal
remains disposition law was protection of “public health and welfare,”
not protection of the fetus.156
Finally, the court declared that even if Indiana had a legitimate interest
“in the humane and dignified disposal of aborted fetuses,” an interest that
would “require[] recognizing that the fetus is legally equivalent to a
human,” the state’s disposition requirement was not rationally related to
that interest because it did not treat fetal remains in the same manner as
human remains.157 According to the court, the disposition requirement
allows a woman to determine how to dispose of her aborted fetus, and
Indiana law does not otherwise allow a person to dispose of human
remains in whatever way she wishes.158 Moreover, the court pointed out,
the disposition statute broadly permits simultaneous cremation of the
remains of different fetuses, a practice that is restricted when disposing
of other human remains.159
B. Hellerstedt II
Unlike the court in PPINK, whose rigorous application of the rational
basis standard led to the demise of Indiana’s fetal remains disposition
law, the Texas district court in Hellerstedt II looked to Casey’s undue
burden standard—and the Hellerstedt I Court’s interpretation of it—to
enjoin the amendments to the DSHS regulations and Texas statute
governing the disposition of fetal remains.160 And consistent with
155. Id. at 309. See also notes 50–62 and accompanying text (discussing Planned
Parenthood of Minnesota).
156. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 309. See also notes 50–62 and accompanying text (discussing
Planned Parenthood of Minnesota).
157. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 309.
158. See id. (describing laws governing burial and cremation).
159. See id. (discussing when simultaneous cremation is permitted).
160. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 232 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (deciding that the
plaintiffs were likely to succeed in claiming that the Texas amendments violate the undue burden
test); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317 at *5 (“Plaintiff [sic] . . . establish a substantial
likelihood of success on their claim Chapter 697 imposes an undue burden on . . . [a woman’s]
right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.”). Although DSHS claimed that the Texas
statute superseded the earlier amended regulations, the court declined to consider the earlier
regulations moot because DSHS had not provided evidence that the statute replaced the
regulations and because, if not invalid themselves, the regulations would apply in the event the
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Hellerstedt I, the Hellerstedt II court claimed that to survive the undue
burden test, an abortion regulation must serve a legitimate state interest
and the burdens the regulation imposes on a woman’s ability to choose
abortion must not outweigh the regulation’s benefits.161
The DSHS regulations and the Texas statute, the court found, failed
at every turn. First, while acknowledging that Casey recognizes that the
state has an interest in protecting potential life, the court determined that
the amendments to the DSHS regulations did not further that interest
because the DSHS regulations apply after an abortion occurs, when no
potential life is left to protect.162 Similarly, in considering the Texas
legislation, the district court stated that “there is no precedent showing
[that there is a legitimate state interest in] expressing respect for the
unborn by restricting [embryonic and fetal tissue remains] disposal after
the potential for life no longer exists.”163 Moreover, the court in
Hellerstedt II observed that both the amendments to the DSHS
regulations and the later-adopted Texas law suggest that human life
begins at conception and thereby might interfere with a woman’s
constitutionally-protected right to her own personal beliefs.164
Second, the court decided that the benefits associated with the DSHS
regulations and the Texas statute were insignificant. With respect to the
statute, the court stated that “the only identified benefit is the expression
of the State’s respect for the unborn.”165 And the court rejected the
assertion that the amendments to the DSHS regulations would “confer[]
dignity on the unborn,” questioning how DSHS’s recommendation that
statute is invalid. See Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317 at *4 (discussing the mootness of the
DSHS regulations).
161. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 228 (indicating that the Supreme Court in
Hellerstedt I, “confirmed that a state must act on a legitimate interest” and that a court must weigh
the benefits and burdens of the law in determining whether it violates a woman’s constitutional
rights); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, *5–6 (describing the undue burden test as
explained in Hellerstedt I).
162. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229.
163. Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6.
164. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (noting Casey’s reference to a person’s right
to “define [her] own concept of the mystery of human life.”); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL
30317, at *7 (noting the same Casey reference to a person’s right to define the concept of human
life). The court also pointed out that, based on the timing of publication of the amendments in
relation to the decision in Hellerstedt I and given the fact that DSHS only considered the financial
impact with respect to abortion (and not the impact in other circumstances under which disposal
of fetal tissue would be required), it could conclude that the regulations were unconstitutional
because they were designed to restrict access to abortion. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229–
30. Because the statutory disposition requirements at one point had been part of a larger bill that
prohibit certain abortions, the court similarly speculated that the underlying purpose of the statute
might be to restrict abortion. Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6.
165. Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *7.
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fetal remains from separate procedures be placed in a single container and
frozen until disposal better protected dignity than the current
regulations.166 In addition, the court indicated that the fact that the DSHS
regulations did not apply to fetal remains expelled or removed outside a
medical facility weakened the benefit DSHS suggested.167
Finally, the Hellerstedt II court recited a series of burdens that the
amended regulations and the Texas statute might impose on a woman’s
ability to have an abortion. For example, the court stated that the
regulations and law would cause health care providers to incur additional
costs and that DSHS had underestimated the costs associated with the
regulations by failing to take into account Texas’s size and population, as
well as “transportation costs, administrative costs, [and] . . . vendor
availability.”168 The court also suggested that a lack of vendor availability
might lead to facility closures.169 In addition, according to the court, the
amended regulations and the Texas statute would present logistical
challenges for medical facilities with respect to “sorting procedure,
storage, transportation, and ultimate disposal and might cause women to
experience “grief and shame,” thereby deterring them from seeking
appropriate medical care.170 Although the court acknowledged that the
Texas legislature had attempted to ameliorate some of the potential
problems associated with the DSHS regulations—by mandating a
registry accessible to physicians and health care facilities that identifies
parties willing to provide free or low-cost burial or financial assistance to
defray the costs of cremation or burial, and by directing the development
of a grant program to assist with the costs arising from disposition of fetal

166. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230.
167. Id. at 230.
168. Id. See Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6 (citing increased costs as a burden).
169. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 231 (noting testimony that one “center was nearly
forced to close after two successive medical waste disposal vendors dropped the healthcare
facility” and concluding that “there may be insufficient vendors to handle the disposal of fetal
tissue in compliance with the Amendments, which would be a major, if not fatal, blow to
healthcare providers performing abortions.”). DSHS had identified two possible vendors who
might provide for disposal—a funeral home and the Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops. See
Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 231. The court discounted both, indicating that neither appeared
to have the appropriate permits, that the funeral home was inexperienced and would impose a
specific requirement that could increase costs, and that use of the Texas Catholic Conference of
Bishops might “distress[] patients who have different religious views or do not see fetal tissue as
a person.” Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 231.
170. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230. See Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *7
(indicating that it was “unclear” as to whether the Texas statute resolved the logistical difficulties
associated with the DSHS regulations and that evidence indicated that the fetal remains
disposition requirements might result in “grief and shame”).
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remains as required by law—171 the Hellerstedt II court assigned little
weight to those measures because it could identify no evidence that they
would have an appreciable impact when the Texas statute was set to
become effective.172
Having considered both the potential benefits and burdens of the
DSHS amendments, the court in Hellerstedt II decided that the increased
costs, the possible “stigma” on women, and the “potentially devastating
logistical challenges for abortion providers” were likely to “substantially
outweigh” the questionable benefit of protecting the dignity of the
unborn.173 Likewise, the court determined that the burdens it had
identified with respect to the Texas statute exceeded the sole identified
benefit of expressing respect for life.174 Thus, within the space of about a
year, the court had granted preliminary injunctions against both the
DSHS amendments and the later-adopted Texas legislation.175
C. Examining PPINK and Hellerstedt II
Although the Seventh Circuit in PPINK and the Texas district court in
Hellerstedt II took different paths, they have in common some serious
flaws that undermine their conclusions. Contrary to what the two courts
found, the Indiana statute at issue in PPINK and the DSHS amendments
and Texas statute at issue in Hellerstedt II all serve the same legitimate,
important, substantial, and profound governmental interest—the interest
in protecting potential life.176 The three measures therefore easily satisfy
the rational basis standard of review.
In addition, the fetal remains disposition requirements in Indiana and
Texas offer benefits sufficient to meet the extremely low standard that
applies under Casey’s undue burden test for abortion regulations
designed to advance the state’s interest in protecting potential life. Thus,
if Casey’s undue burden standard applies as the Texas district court
decided in Hellerstedt II, the real question for the requirements is whether
they impose burdens of the magnitude that led the Court to strike down
the Pennsylvania spousal notification requirement in Casey and the Texas
admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements in
Hellerstedt I. When viewed in light of the history of fetal remains
171. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 697.005–.006 (West 2017) (requiring DSHS
to establish a registry to help reduce costs associated with the disposition requirements and
directing DSHS to establish a grant program).
172. See Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *7 (giving little credit to the registry and
grant program).
173. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 232.
174. See Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *7 (concluding that the burdens associated
with the law surpassed the benefit).
175. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 232–33; Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *8.
176. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (reciting the various ways in which the Court
has described the interest in protecting potential life).
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disposition requirements, this seems very unlikely. Thus, the Indiana
statute, the DSHS amendments, and the Texas legislation are apt to
survive a substantive due process challenge irrespective of whether
rational basis review or the undue burden test represents the proper
standard. And when one examines the PPINK and Hellerstedt II opinions
closely, it is easy to see the mistakes that took the Seventh Circuit and the
Texas district court in the opposite direction.
1. The State’s Interest in Protecting Potential Life
Regardless of whether rational basis review or Casey’s undue burden
test is the appropriate measure to use in assessing the constitutionality of
a fetal remains disposition requirement, a court must consider whether
the government has a legitimate interest that will sustain the requirement.
Neither the Seventh Circuit in PPINK nor the Texas district court in
Hellerstedt II found one.177 The court in PPINK found inapplicable the
asserted governmental interests in “‘the humane and dignified disposal of
fetal remains,’” “promoting respect for potential life,” upholding “fetal
human dignity,” and “‘protecting public sensibilities.”178 Similarly, when
considering the DSHS amendments, the court in Hellerstedt II rejected
interests in “‘afford[ing] the level of protection and dignity to the unborn
children as state law afford [sic] to adults and children,’” “respecting [the]
‘life and dignity of the unborn,’” and protecting potential life.179 Finally,
with respect to the Texas fetal remains disposition statute, the Hellerstedt
II court claimed that “there is no precedent showing expressing respect
for the unborn by restricting [embryonic and fetal tissue remains] after
the potential for life no longer exists is a valid state interest.”180
Whatever one might conclude about the other interests the two courts
considered, their dismissal of Indiana’s and Texas’s interest in protecting
potential life reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of
that interest and what a state might do to advance it. Roe, Casey, and
Gonzales are clear that the state has a profound, important, substantial,
and legitimate interest in protecting potential life,181 and the courts in
PPINK and Hellerstedt II incorrectly attempted to confine that interest by
177. See PPINK, 888 F.3d 300, 309 (7th Cir. 2018); Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230.
178. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308–09.
179. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229.
180. Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6.
181. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 126 (2007) (“A central premise of Casey’s joint
opinion [is] that the government has a legitimate, substantial interest in preserving and promoting
fetal life . . . .”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (“The very
notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all
regulations must be deemed unwarranted.”); id. at 878 (noting “the State’s profound interest in
potential life”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (observing that the state has an “important
and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life”).
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concluding that it could not justify a regulation that applies most directly
to a fetus that no longer has the potential for life.182 Either a state has a
legitimate interest in some end or it does not, and the Roe Court did not
limit the interest in protecting potential life to particular points in time;
instead, the Court described the relative strength of the interest as a
pregnancy progresses: “[The interest] grows in substantiality as the
woman approaches term . . . .”183 And while CaseyDQGGonzalesGHVFULEH
WKHVWDWHۑVLQWHUHVWLQSRWHQWLDOOLIHDVLWUHODWHVWRDSDUWLFXODUZRPDQۑV
SUHJQDQF\WKH\GRQRWLQGLFDWHWKDWUHJXODWLRQVDIIHFWLQJZRPHQZKR
DUHQRWSUHJQDQW RUQRORQJHUDUHSUHJQDQW FDQQRWEHIRXQGHGRQWKDW
LQWHUHVW ,QGHHG WKH &RXUW LQ Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
CountyLPSOLHVWKDWDODZDIIHFWLQJPHQPD\EHMXVWLILHGEDVHGRQWKH
VWDWHۑV LQWHUHVW LQ SURWHFWLQJ SRWHQWLDO OLIH ,Q WKDW FDVH WKH &RXUW
GHWHUPLQHGWKDWDVWDWHۑVLQWHUHVWLQSUHYHQWLQJDERUWLRQZRXOGMXVWLI\D
&DOLIRUQLD۔VWDWXWRU\UDSHەODZ
The justification for the statute offered by the State . . . is
that the legislature sought to prevent illegitimate teenage
pregnancies. . . . And although our cases establish that the
State’s asserted reason for the enactment of a statute may be
rejected, if it ‘could not have been a goal of the legislation,’
this is not such a case. . . . We are satisfied not only that the
prevention of illegitimate pregnancy is at least one of the
“purposes” of the statute, but also that the State has a strong
interest in preventing such pregnancy. . . . Of particular
concern to the State is that approximately half of all teenage
pregnancies end in abortion.185
0RUHRYHU FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW D VWDWH KDV QR OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVW LQ
SURWHFWLQJ SRWHQWLDO OLIH ZLWK UHVSHFW WR D UHJXODWLRQ WKDW DIIHFWV D
ZRPDQ ZKR LV QR ORQJHU SUHJQDQW LV HQWLUHO\ LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH
&RXUWۑV DSSURYDO RI SRVWDERUWLRQ UHSRUWLQJ DQG UHFRUGNHHSLQJ
UHTXLUHPHQWV EDVHG RQ WKH VWDWHۑV LQWHUHVW LQ VDIHJXDUGLQJ PDWHUQDO
KHDOWK 6XFK UHSRUWLQJ DQG UHFRUGNHHSLQJ UHTXLUHPHQWV DSSO\ WR
DERUWLRQVWKDWKDYHEHHQFRPSOHWHGDQGGRQRWKLQJWRPDNHVDIHUWKH
DERUWLRQVWRZKLFKWKH\DSSO\<HWLWLVFOHDUIURPDanforth DQGCasey
182. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308 (“The fetal disposition provisions differ because there is no
potential life at stake.”); Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (“The Amendments
regulate . . . activities that occur when there is no potential life to protect.”); Hellerstedt II (order),
2018 BL 30317, at *6 (“Gonzalez merely confirmed ‘the government may use its voice and its
regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman.’” (emphasis in
original)).
183. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
184. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
185. Id. at 470–71.
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WKDWWKHVWDWHۑVOHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVWLQVDIHJXDUGLQJPDWHUQDOKHDOWKZLOO
MXVWLI\SRVWDERUWLRQUHSRUWLQJDQGUHFRUGNHHSLQJUHTXLUHPHQWV7KH
YHU\VDPHORJLFDSSOLHVWRIHWDOUHPDLQVGLVSRVLWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV7KH
IDFW WKDW WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV DSSO\ PRVW GLUHFWO\ WR IHWXVHV ZKRVH
SRWHQWLDOOLYHVQRORQJHUFDQEHSURWHFWHGGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWWKHVWDWHۑV
LQWHUHVWLQSURWHFWLQJSRWHQWLDOOLIHLVQRORQJHUUHOHYDQW
7KXV WKH DSSURSULDWH TXHVWLRQ ZLWK UHVSHFW WR D IHWDO UHPDLQV
GLVSRVLWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWLVQRWZKHWKHUDVWDWHKDVDOHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVW
LQSURWHFWLQJSRWHQWLDOOLIHEXWZKHWKHUWKHUHTXLUHPHQWPLJKWDGYDQFH
WKDW LQWHUHVW $QG FRQVLGHULQJ WKH IDUUHDFKLQJ HIIHFW WKDW D IHWDO
UHPDLQVGLVSRVLWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWPD\KDYHWKHDQVZHULV\HV
:KHQ WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW LQ Hellerstedt II HYDOXDWHG WKH SRVVLEOH
EHQHILWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK7H[DVۑVIHWDOUHPDLQVGLVSRVLWLRQUHTXLUHPHQW
LWQDUURZO\IRFXVHGRQZKHWKHUWKHUHTXLUHPHQWDGYDQFHGWKHGLJQLW\
RI D IHWXV ZKR KDV EHHQ DERUWHG ,Q VR GRLQJ WKH FRXUW ZURQJO\
LJQRUHG WKH UHTXLUHPHQWۑV EURDGHU HIIHFW RI GLVFRXUDJLQJ DERUWLRQ LQ
JHQHUDOE\FDXVLQJZRPHQیDQGVRFLHW\DVDZKROHیWRUHIOHFWRQWKH
QDWXUHRIDIHWXV,QWKLVZD\DIHWDOUHPDLQVGLVSRVLWLRQUHTXLUHPHQW
VHUYHVWKHVWDWHۑVLQWHUHVWLQSURWHFWLQJSRWHQWLDOOLIHLQDPDQQHUVLPLODU
WRUHTXLULQJDQDERUWLRQSURYLGHUWRLQIRUPDZRPDQDERXWLQIRUPDWLRQ
UHJDUGLQJWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDIHWXV$QGDIHWDOUHPDLQVGLVSRVLWLRQ
UHTXLUHPHQW HYHQ PRUH FORVHO\ UHVHPEOHV WKH IHGHUDO SDUWLDOELUWK
DERUWLRQEDQZKLFKWKHGonzales &RXUWXSKHOGRYHU-XVWLFH*LQVEHUJۑV
FODLPWKDWWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIDOWHUQDWLYHPHWKRGVRIDERUWLRQPHDQWWKDW
WKHEDQZRXOG۔QRW>VDYH@DVLQJOHIHWXVIURPGHVWUXFWLRQ)ەRUWKH
PDMRULW\ LQ Gonzales WKH YHU\ IDFW WKDW NQRZOHGJH RI WKH EDQ PLJKW
LQIOXHQFHVRPHZRPHQWRFKRRVHFKLOGELUWKRYHUDERUWLRQZDVHQRXJK
The Act expresses respect for the dignity of human
life. . . . It is a reasonable inference that a necessary effect of
the regulation and the knowledge it conveys will be to
encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus
186. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 900–01 (“Although [the recordkeeping and reporting provisions]
do not relate to the State’s interest in informing the woman’s choice, they do relate to health. The
collection of information with respect to actual patients is a vital element of medical research, and
so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortions more
difficult.”); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 81 (“Recordkeeping of this kind, if not abused or overdone, can
be useful to the State’s interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, and may be a resource
that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment.”).
187. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230 (evaluating the benefits of Texas’s fetal
remains disposition requirements).
188. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (upholding a Pennsylvania statute that requires “the
physician [who is to perform an abortion] or a qualified nonphysician [to] inform the woman of
the availability of printed materials published by the State describing the fetus”).
189. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 181 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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reducing the absolute number of late-term abortions. . . . The
State’s interest in respect for life is advanced by the dialogue
that better informs the political and legal systems, the
medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a
whole of the consequences that follow from a decision to
elect a late-term abortion.190
7KH VDPH WKLQJ HDVLO\ FDQ EH VDLG RI D IHWDO UHPDLQV GLVSRVLWLRQ
UHTXLUHPHQW%\UHTXLULQJWKDWIHWDOUHPDLQVEHGLVSRVHGRILQDPDQQHU
VLPLODUWRWKHGLVSRVDORIUHPDLQVRIDKXPDQERG\WKDWZDVERUQWKH
VWDWHH[SUHVVHVLWVYLHZWKDWERWKDIHWXVDQGDSHUVRQZKRLVERUQDUH
KXPDQWKDWWKH\VKDUHWKHVDPHGLJQLW\DQGWKDWWKHLUOLYHVWKHUHIRUH
VKRXOGEHSURWHFWHGLQWKHVDPHZD\$VWKHGLVVHQWLQJMXGJHLQPlanned
Parenthood Association of Cincinnati, Inc. v. CincinnatiH[SODLQHGZLWK
UHVSHFWWRD&LQFLQQDWLIHWDOUHPDLQVGLVSRVLWLRQRUGLQDQFHWKHVWDWHۑV
DELOLW\WRH[SUHVVLWVYLHZLVLPSRUWDQW ۔Insofar as the ordinance may
serve as an indirect reminder that there is a school of thought that equates
such termination of a pregnancy with termination of a life, the ordinance
may conceivably make for slightly more thoughtful decisions on whether
to terminate or not to terminate.”192 Thus, a fetal remains disposition
requirement serves the state’s interest in protecting potential life by
attempting to ensure that women make informed decisions about whether
to choose abortion.
Moreover, the Court in CaseyDQGGonzalesVWUHVVHGWKDWNQRZOHGJH
RIWKHHIIHFWRIDQDERUWLRQRQDIHWXVLVDFULWLFDODVSHFWRIDZRPDQۑV
EHLQJ LQIRUPHG 7KH Casey &RXUW HPSKDVL]HG ZKDW LV DW VWDNH ۔,Q
DWWHPSWLQJWRHQVXUHWKDWDZRPDQDSSUHKHQGWKHIXOOFRQVHTXHQFHVRI
KHUGHFLVLRQWKH6WDWHIXUWKHUVWKHOHJLWLPDWHSXUSRVHRIUHGXFLQJWKH
ULVNWKDWDZRPDQPD\HOHFWDQDERUWLRQRQO\WRGLVFRYHUODWHUZLWK
GHYDVWDWLQJSV\FKRORJLFDOFRQVHTXHQFHVWKDWKHUGHFLVLRQZDVQRWIXOO\
LQIRUPHGە$QGWKH&RXUWLQGonzalesVDLGOLNHZLVH۔:KLOHZHILQG
QRUHOLDEOHGDWDWRPHDVXUHWKHSKHQRPHQRQLWVHHPVXQH[FHSWLRQDEOH
190. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157, 160.
191. 822 F.2d 1390 (1987).
192. Id. at 1405 (Nelson, J., dissenting). In Planned Parenthood Association of Cincinnati,
the Sixth Circuit upheld an injunction against a fetal remains disposition requirement on the
grounds of vagueness and did consider whether the requirement impermissibly infringed on a
woman’s ability to choose abortion. See id. at 1399 (granting a preliminary injunction against a
fetal remains requirement based on a claim that the requirement was unconstitutionally vague).
193. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (“Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an
abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.”);
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159–60 (indicating that the state has an interest in making sure that a woman
makes informed decisions and that knowing how her fetus was aborted may intensify grief if she
comes to regret her abortion).
194. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
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WRFRQFOXGHVRPHZRPHQFRPHWRUHJUHWWKHLUFKRLFHWRDERUWWKHLQIDQW
OLIH WKH\RQFHFUHDWHGDQG VXVWDLQHG ە,QGHHGZKDW Gonzales VWDWHV
DERXWWKHSRVVLEOHHIIHFWRQDZRPDQZKHQVKHOHDUQVDERXWKRZKHU
DERUWLRQ ZDV SHUIRUPHG LV HDVLO\ PRGLILHG WR PDNH WKH SRLQW ZLWK
UHVSHFWWRDZRPDQۑVEHLQJLQIRUPHGDERXWWKHPDQQHURIGLVSRVDORI
DQDERUWHGIHWXV
In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some
doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the
means that will be used [to dispose of a woman’s aborted
fetus]. . . . It is, however, precisely this lack of information
concerning the way in which the fetus will be [disposed of]
that is of legitimate concern to the State. The State has an
interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed. It is
self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to
abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow
more profound when she learns, only after the event, what
she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to [dispose
of the body] of her unborn child, a child assuming the human
form [by grinding and discharging the child’s body to a
sewer system].196
In addition to inappropriately confining the governmental interest in
protecting potential life and ignoring the potential role fetal remains
disposition requirements may play in informing a woman’s decision
about abortion, the Seventh Circuit in PPINK and the Texas district court
in Hellerstedt II failed to appreciate that the Supreme Court’s
determination that a fetus is not a person for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment197 in no way prevents a state from treating fetal remains as
it would the remains of a person who had been born.198 Importantly, the
195. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159.
196. Id. at 160. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 223 (noting that “grinding and
discharging to a sanitary sewer system” historically had been a permitted means for disposing of
an aborted or miscarried fetus).
197. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (“[T]he word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,
does not include the unborn.”).
198. See PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308 (“[T]he Supreme Court has concluded that ‘the word
‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.’ . . . As such, the
State’s interest in requiring abortion providers to dispose of aborted fetuses in the same manner
as human remains is not legitimate.”); Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (“[B]y seeking to
respect life and the dignity of the unborn regardless of gestational age, DSHS appears to be
inferentially establishing the beginning of human life as conception . . . .”).
Fetal remains disposition requirements are not the only way in which states treat prenatal life
in a manner consistent with how they treat a person who has been born. More than two-thirds of
the states, including Indiana and Texas, have homicide laws that apply to fetuses. See NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/fetal-homicide-statelaws.aspx [https://perma.cc/2GGQ-B4DT] (discussing fetal homicide laws and listing the states
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Court in Roe stated: “Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in
this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins
at conception or at some other point prior to live birth.”199 And less than
five years later, the Court in Maher v. Roe stressed: “[T]he right [to an
abortion] protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with
her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion . . . .”200
Furthermore, if Roe and Maher aren’t clear enough, the Court’s
decision in Webster leaves no doubt that regardless of who is considered
a person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may take a
position on when life begins. The Webster Court considered a challenge
to a Missouri law whose preamble stated plainly that “[t]he life of each
human being begins at conception.”201 And in determining that the
preamble did present a constitutional issue, the Court observed:
[T]he meaning of the Akron dictum . . . was only that a
State could not “justify” an abortion regulation otherwise
invalid under Roe v. Wade on the ground that it embodied
the State’s view about when life begins. . . . The Court has
emphasized that Roe v. Wade “implies no limitation on the
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion.” The preamble can be read simply
to express that sort of value judgment.202
According to the Court, the state’s view of when life begins only takes
on constitutional significance when it actually affects a woman’s ability

that have them). Notwithstanding the Court’s recognition in Roe that a fetus or embryo is not a
person for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Seventh Circuit has explained that the
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence does not preclude states from adopting these laws. See
Coe v. County of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 497 (7th Cir. 1998) (“States remain free to punish feticide
so long as they don’t try to punish a woman who exercises her constitutional right to abort her
fetus, the physician who performs the abortion, or the hospital or other facility, even if public, in
which the abortion is performed.”). See also DeGasperin v. Ballard, No. 16-0133, 2017 WL
663577, at *16 (“This Court finds and concludes that neither Roe v. Wade nor its progeny prevent
a state legislature from making an unborn fetus or embryo the victim of any of the above crimes.”);
State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990) (“Roe v. Wade protects the woman’s right of
choice; it does not protect, much less confer on an assailant, a third-party unilateral right to destroy
the fetus.”).
199. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.
200. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (“But the
constitutional freedom recognized in Wade and its progeny, the Maher Court explained, did not
prevent Connecticut from making ‘a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion’ . . . .”).
201. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 504 (1989).
202. Id. at 506.
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to choose to terminate her pregnancy.203 The very fact that a regulation
evidences a particular view on personhood—one that is contrary to what
the Court has determined for purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment—is
inapposite.
2. Rational Basis Review
,I RQH DYRLGV WKH HUURUV WKDW WKH 6HYHQWK &LUFXLW DQG WKH 7H[DV
GLVWULFW FRXUW PDGH ZLWK UHVSHFW WR D VWDWHۑV LQWHUHVW LQ SURWHFWLQJ
SRWHQWLDOOLIHLWLVHDV\WRVHHWKDWIHWDOUHPDLQVGLVSRVLWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV
OLNH WKRVH LQ ,QGLDQD DQG 7H[DV VXUYLYH UDWLRQDO EDVLV UHYLHZ As the
Seventh Circuit explained, when a measure is subject to rational basis
review, the legislature is entitled to broad deference and the plaintiff’s
burden is a high one: “So long as there is any conceivable state of facts
that supports the policy, it passes muster under the due process clause;
put another way, only if the policy is patently arbitrary would it fail.”204
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stressed that “rational-basis
review . . . ‘is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or
logic of legislative choices[,]’” and “a legislature . . . need not ‘actually
articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting [the choices it
makes].’”205
With these principles in mind, applying the rational basis standard to
fetal remains disposition requirements like those in Indiana and Texas is
very straightforward. First, as discussed above, at least since Roe, the
Court has recognized that a state has an “important and legitimate”
interest in protecting potential life.206 Second, the Court in both Casey
and Gonzales pointed out that a state may advance this interest by
“express[ing] profound respect for the life of the unborn.”207 Third, the
Court in Gonzales emphasized that a government can express its respect
through the mere adoption of an abortion regulation: “[T]he government
may use its voice and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect
for the life within [a] woman.” . . . >۔$@QHFHVVDU\HIIHFWRI>DQDERUWLRQ@
UHJXODWLRQ DQG the knowledge it conveys >PD\@ EH WR HQFRXUDJH VRPH
ZRPHQWRFDUU\WKHLQIDQWWRIXOOWHUP)ەLQDOO\,QGLDQDDQG7H[DV
203. See id. at 506 (“It will be time enough for federal courts to address the meaning of the
preamble should it be applied to restrict the activities of appellees in some concrete way.”).
204. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308 (quoting Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp.,
743 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2014)).
205. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993).
206. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
207. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146 (emphasizing Casey’s
recognition that “[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the
State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn
are permitted . . . .”).
208. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157, 160 (emphasis added).
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FHUWDLQO\FRXOGKDYHEHOLHYHGWKDWMXVWDVDEDQRQSDUWLDOELUWKDERUWLRQ
might cause a pregnant woman to see the fetus as a person, so might
requiring a health care facility to dispose of an aborted or miscarried fetus
in a manner similar to that in which a born human body is disposed.
Indeed, even the Seventh Circuit testified as to the unmistakable message
a fetal remains disposition requirement sends: >۔7@KH KXPDQH DQG
GLJQLILHGGLVSRVDORIDERUWHGIHWXVHVUHTXLUHVUHFRJQL]LQJWKDWWKHIHWXV
LV    HTXLYDOHQW WR D KXPDQ ە$ SUHJQDQW ZRPDQ ZKR FRPHV WR
UHFRJQL]HWKDWHTXLYDOHQFHPLJKWFKRRVHFKLOGELUWKRYHUDERUWLRQDQG
under rational basis review, this possibility is sufficient.210 As the Court
emphasized in H.L. v. Matheson, “State action ‘encouraging childbirth
except in the most urgent circumstances’ is ‘rationally related to the
legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life.’”211
Satisfaction of the rational basis standard is just that simple, and the
Seventh Circuit in PPINK was wrong to complicate it by dismissing
Indiana’s interest in protecting potential life and going through a meansends test that more closely resembles intermediate or strict scrutiny.212
3. Casey’s Undue Burden Standard
While the Supreme Court has used rational basis review for some
regulations touching on abortion—such as a Connecticut regulation that
denied Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic abortions and the federal
Hyde Amendment, which bars the use of Medicaid funds for certain
abortions—a key point that led the Court to apply the deferential standard
in those cases was that the regulations did not impose any barriers to
abortion.213 In contrast, the plaintiffs in Hellerstedt II insisted that the
209. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 309. See also Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 222 (W.D. Tex.
2017) (“The Amendments inferentially establish the beginning of life . . . .”); Margaret S. v.
Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 222 (E.D. La. 1980) (“Such a question equates the abortion process
with the taking of a human life . . . .”); Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 669 (E.D. La.
1984) (“Underlying this requirement, plaintiffs argue, is the belief that the aborted fetus is a
‘baby,’ and therefore entitled to the same kind of ritual upon death as are other human beings.”).
210. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“It is enough
that there is [problem requiring] correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure [is] a rational way to correct it.” (emphasis added)); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“[T] he Constitution presumes that even
improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.”).
211. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
325 (1980)).
212. See PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308–09 (analyzing whether the statute required fetal remains
to be treated in the same manner that human remains must be treated under other Indiana law).
213. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474, 478 (1977) (indicating that the regulation at issue
“place[d] no obstacles—absolute or otherwise—in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion” and
that the issue was “whether [the] regulation [could] be sustained under the less demanding test of
rationality”); McRae, 448 U.S. at 315, 324 (stating that “[t]he Hyde Amendment, like the
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Texas fetal remains disposition requirements place obstacles in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion by increasing the cost of the procedure,
creating logistical challenges for abortion providers, and potentially
causing women to experience “grief and shame.”214 Thus, it was not
unreasonable for the Hellerstedt II court to assess Texas’s fetal remains
disposition requirements under Casey’s undue burden test. Even under
this more rigorous test, however, fetal remains disposition requirements
like those adopted in Indiana and Texas should survive constitutional
challenge.
The Hellerstedt I Court stated that the undue burden standard requires
a court to balance the benefits and burdens of an abortion regulation, but
as discussed in Part II.B, Casey and Gonzales teach that, for a regulation
designed to protect potential life to satisfy the undue burden test, it need
only be plausible that the regulation would cause a woman to choose
childbirth over abortion.215 If a partial-birth abortion ban and a
requirement WKDWDSK\VLFLDQPHUHO\LQIRUPDSUHJQDQWZRPDQWKDWVKH
KDVWKHULJKWWRUHYLHZPDWHULDOVGHVFULELQJIHWDOGHYHORSPHQWVDWLVI\
WKLVUHTXLUHPHQWVRdoes a regulation mandating disposition of the body
of a dead fetus in the same manner that is required for the disposition of
a body that has been born. At least “in theory,”216 “a necessary effect” of
requiring disposal of fetal remains as one would of a body of a person
who was born will be to cause “some women” to see that the two share

Connecticut welfare regulation at issue in Maher, places no governmental obstacle in the path of
a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy” and then asking “whether the Hyde
Amendment is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective”).
214. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230; Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317 *1, *7
(W.D. Tex. 2018). See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230–32 (discussing burdens associated
with the DSHS regulations); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6–7 (discussing burdens
associated with the Texas statute). The plaintiffs in PPINK likely would have had difficulty
asserting that the challenged statute created the potential for “grief and shame” because existing
Indiana law required that a woman be told of her right to dispose of the fetus and that she inform
the abortion facility in writing of her decision regarding disposition. See IND. CODE § 16-34-21.1(a)(2)(H) & (I) (2018) (requiring notification of woman’s right to direct disposition); IND.
CODE § 16-34-3-2(b) (requiring woman to inform abortion facility in writing of her decision
regarding disposition). And while one of the plaintiffs in PPINK suggested at the district court
level that Indiana’s statute would increase the costs of abortion providers, see PPINK, 194 F.
Supp. 3d 818, 825 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (“PPINK produced evidence that compliance with the new
fetal tissue disposition provisions will result in a meaningful increase in its expenses.”), the
Seventh Circuit did not address this point, perhaps because it is irrelevant under rational basis
review.
215. See supra Part II.B (discussing the minimal benefit required for regulations designed to
advance the State’s interest in protecting potential life).
216. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992).
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the same dignity, thereby “encourag[ing] [those women] to carry the
infant to full term.”217 That is enough for the undue burden test.
In finding that the admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center
requirements at issue in Hellerstedt I yielded no appreciable benefit from
the standpoint of maternal health, the Court asserted that abortion was
already an “extremely safe” procedure in Texas, and “[t]hus, there was
no significant health-related problem that the new law helped to cure.”218
With significant numbers of abortions being performed across the United
217. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 160 (2007).
218. Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2311 (2016). In discussing the absence of a health-related
benefit attributable to Texas’s ambulatory surgery center requirement, the Court pointed out that
Texas did not require facilities in which liposuction and colonoscopies are performed to meet the
standards for ambulatory surgery centers, notwithstanding the evidence that those procedures are
safer than abortion. See id. at 2315 (discussing other procedures). Given the relative safety of the
other procedures, the Court concluded that the differential treatment of abortion facilities could
not be justified based on the state’s interest in protecting maternal health. See id. at 2315 (“These
facts indicate that the surgical-center provision imposes ‘a requirement that simply is not based
on differences’ between abortion and other surgical procedures ‘that are reasonably related to’
preserving women’s health, the asserted ‘purpos[e] of the Act . . . .’”). When the state is seeking
to advance its interest in protecting potential life, however, treating the abortion procedure
differently from other medical procedures is permissible given the presence of the fetus. See
Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (“Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for
others: for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision; … and, depending on
one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted.”); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1976) (permitting an informed consent requirement for abortion
even though similar requirements do not apply to most other surgeries and indicating that “[t]he
decision to abort … is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative
that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences”); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 159 (1973) (“She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions
of the developing young in the human uterus. The situation therefore is inherently different from
marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or
education . . . .” (citation omitted)). Therefore, imposing requirements for the disposition of
fetuses that are different from those applicable to other tissue does not, without more, create a
constitutional problem. Moreover, imposing the same or similar requirements for the disposition
of the remains of miscarried fetuses, as the DSHS amendments, the new Texas statute, and a
separate Indiana law do, delivers a consistent message regarding the value of pre-natal life. See
Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 223 (indicating that Texas’s regulations regarding the disposition
of fetal remains applied to miscarried fetuses); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 697.004(a)
(West 2017) (applying broadly to embryonic and fetal tissue remains); IND. CODE § 16-21-11-6(b)
(2018) (requiring cremation or interment of a miscarried fetus). Notably, since 2014, Indiana has
required health care facilities to notify the parents of a miscarried fetus of their right to determine
the disposition of the fetus. IND. CODE § 16-21-11-5 (2017).
The Texas district court in Hellerstedt II suggested that not imposing the DSHS fetal remains
disposition requirements when a miscarried or aborted fetus is delivered at home “reduces the
strength of the asserted benefit” of “conferring dignity on the unborn.” Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp.
3d at 230. Whether the exception undermines that benefit or not, the Hellerstedt II court failed to
recognize that “privacy concerns implicit in activity in one’s home” offer a legitimate basis for
the differential treatment. Planned Parenthood of Minn., 910 F.2d 479, 488 (8th Cir. 1990).
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States (including in Texas and in Indiana),219 however, the same cannot
be said with respect to the state’s interest in protecting potential life. So
long as there is abortion, the state will have a reason to express its view
regarding pre-natal life, and laws like fetal remains disposition
requirements that express that view will offer a benefit sufficient to
satisfy Casey’s undue burden test.
As a result, whether a fetal remains disposition requirement passes the
undue burden test depends on the requirement’s burdens—specifically,
on whether the requirement imposes “a substantial obstacle in the path of
women seeking an abortion.”220 Under existing precedent, though—
unless the logistical challenges the Hellerstedt II court noted lead to a
significant number of clinic closures—none of the potential burdens the
plaintiffs in Hellerstedt II highlighted are likely to be fatal.
The potential for “grief and shame”221 that the Hellerstedt II court
cites as a possible burden seems unlikely to be invalidating when
considered in light of Casey and Gonzales. The Court’s concern in those
cases was the potential effect on a woman’s psychological health if the
applicable regulations were not in place.222 In fact, in overruling its earlier
decision in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists,223 the Casey Court apparently abandoned its fear that
state-mandated information regarding fetal development might “serve
only to confuse and punish [a woman] and to heighten her anxiety.”224
Rather than focusing on the potentially negative psychological effects of
providing information to a woman seeking an abortion, the Court has
feared what might occur if the state were not permitted to do so—that a
woman might suffer severe anguish if she has an abortion and later

219. See Rachel Jones and Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability In the
United States, 2014, 49 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 17, 21 (2017),
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1363/psrh.12015/full [https://perma.cc/3SCZXKKC] (indicating that more than 900,000 abortions were performed in the United States in 2014,
including over 55,000 in Texas and over 8,000 in Indiana).
220. Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2316. See also Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2312 (“[T]he record
evidence indicates that the admitting privileges requirement places a ‘substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman’s choice.’” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877)); Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–94 (“The
spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent a significant number of women from
obtaining an abortion. . . . [F]or many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle.”).
221. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230; Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *7.
222. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (“In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the
full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk
that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological
consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.”).
223. 476 U.S. 747, 762–63 (1986).
224. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (overruling Thornburgh in part, because it was “inconsistent
with Roe’s acknowledgement of an important interest in potential life”).
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concludes that she was not fully informed.225 As the Court stated in
Gonzales:
In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence
some doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the
means that will be used [to perform an abortion], . . . . From
one standpoint this ought not to be surprising. Any number
of patients facing imminent surgical procedures would
prefer not to hear all details, lest the usual anxiety preceding
invasive medical procedures become the more intense. . . . It
is, however, precisely this lack of information . . . that is of
legitimate concern to the State.226
In addition, the mere fact that an abortion regulation has an adverse
effect on abortion providers will not render it unconstitutional. The Court
in Whalen v. Roe explained this point:
The constitutional right vindicated in Doe was the right
of a pregnant woman to decide whether or not to bear a child
without unwarranted state interference. The statutory
restrictions on the abortion procedures were invalid because
they encumbered the woman’s exercise of that
constitutionally protected right by placing obstacles in the
path of the doctor upon whom she was entitled to rely for
advice in connection with her decision. If those obstacles had
not impacted upon the woman’s freedom to make a
constitutionally protected decision, if they had merely made
the physician’s work more laborious or less independent
without any impact on the patient, they would not have
violated the Constitution.227
Therefore, increased costs and logistical difficulties that abortion
providers may suffer as a result of a fetal remains disposition requirement
are relevant under Casey’s undue burden test only to the extent that they
adversely affect a woman’s access to abortion.
Indeed, Casey emphasizes that “[w]hat is at stake is the woman’s right
to make the ultimate decision.”228 In this regard, the Court’s principal
concern in Hellerstedt I was the fact that Texas’s admitting privileges and
225. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (“[I]t seems unexceptionable to conclude some women
come to regret their choice to abort . . . . Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.”);
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (“In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences
of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may
elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her
decision was not fully informed.”).
226. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159.
227. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977).
228. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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ambulatory surgery center requirement would result in a dramatic
decrease in the number of abortion facilities.229 And when invalidating
Pennsylvania’s spousal notification requirement, the Court in Casey
concluded that it would represent a practical ban on abortion in some
cases, thereby preventing some women from making the decision to have
an abortion.230 On the other hand, the Casey Court stressed that
“numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of
increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care” and
“[t]he fact that a law . . . has the incidental effect of making it more
difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to
invalidate it.”231
Particularly in light of the experience with Minnesota’s 30-year-old
fetal remains disposition requirement, it seems much more likely that
requirements such as those in Indiana and Texas will have a relatively
minor and incidental effect on a woman’s ability to choose abortion,
rather than result in the severe consequences that led the Court to strike
down abortion regulations in Casey and Hellerstedt I. The district court
in Hellerstedt II rejected the state’s estimate of the cost associated with
the DSHS amendments and the state’s assumption that “the ash from all
abortions across the State of Texas could be buried at one time for only
$300 per year”232 and, with respect to the Texas fetal remains disposition
statute, cited evidence that the cost per hospital could “range between
$228,400–$655,200.”233 But the notes accompanying the implementing
regulations for the Texas statute cite testimony from an economist for the
Hellerstedt II plaintiffs that “the cost would range between $0.52 and
$1.56 per patient.”234 Moreover, the statute mandates the creation of a
registry that identifies parties that will provide free or low-cost burial or
will provide financial assistance to defray the costs of cremation or burial
and a grant program to assist with the costs arising from disposition of
fetal remains as required by law.235 And when the Eighth Circuit in
Planned Parenthood of Minnesota upheld a Minnesota fetal remains
229. See supra notes 92 and 97 and accompanying text (describing the effect of the
regulations at issue in Hellerstedt I).
230. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 (“We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant
number of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred
from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all
cases.”).
231. Id. at 874.
232. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230
233. Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6.
234. 43 Tex. Reg. 466 (Jan. 26, 2018).
235. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 697.005–.006 (West 2018) (requiring DSHS
to establish a registry to help reduce the costs likely associated with the disposition requirements
and directing DSHS to establish a grant program).
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disposition requirement in 1990, the court credited evidence that hospitals
had been disposing of remains at a cost of approximately $40–60 per
month. According to the appeals court, “[e]ven if a portion of that cost
[were] passed along to the woman obtaining the abortion,” it would not
be impermissible given the Supreme Court’s previous conclusion in
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft that “costs
of up to $19.40 per patient [would] not create a burden sufficient to strike
down an abortion regulation.”236 Thus, while the Hellerstedt II court
found that the costs associated with the Texas fetal remains disposition
requirements were likely burdensome, there certainly is evidence that
suggests that the burdens may not be of such magnitude that the
requirements run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court in Hellerstedt II added, however, that the DSHS
amendments could deal “a major, if not fatal blow to health care providers
performing abortions.”237 And admittedly, if a fetal remains disposition
requirement were to result in clinic closures in numbers comparable to
236. Planned Parenthood of Minn., 910 F.2d at 487 (citing Planned Parent Ass’n of Kan.
City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 489–90 (1983)).
237. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 232. See Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6
(indicating that, if there are a limited number of vendors, the Texas statute “would threaten the
continued availability of abortion services”). The court noted that “one women’s healthcare
provider testified its center was nearly forced to close after two successive medical waste vendors
dropped the healthcare facility as a client following harassment by anti-abortion activists.”
Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 231; Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6–7. The court,
however, doesn’t take into account the possibility that the opposition was motivated by the way
in which fetal remains then were being disposed of and that abortion foes who favor fetal remains
disposition requirements may be less likely to pressure those who are disposing of remains as
Texas now would require. In fact, the court notes that the Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops
had offered to assist in interment of fetal tissue, and it “exhausts credulity” to believe that the
Texas bishops would experience the hostility that the Texas district court feared. Hellerstedt II,
231 F. Supp. 3d at 231.
The district court in Hellerstedt II also expressed concern about the number of vendors who
would be available to provide for disposition. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 231 (indicating
that the two possible vendors that the parties identified had permitting problems); Hellerstedt II
(order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6 (suggesting there may be a “limited number of vendors” available
to dispose of fetal remains as required by the Texas statute). And a spokesman for the Texas State
Funeral Directors contended that the DSHS amendments created much uncertainty for funeral
homes in the state. See Wade Goodwyn, Funeral Directors Weigh in on Texas Rule Requiring
Burial of Fetal Remains, NPR, Dec. 12, 2016 (“When Gov. Greg Abbott first proposed the new
regulations . . . , funeral home directors went to Austin to convey their apprehensions.”). Funeral
directors and cemeteries in Indiana also have indicated concern about what it would take to
implement Indiana’s law, but representatives of the Indiana Funeral Directors Association and
an organization of the state’s cemeteries have expressed support for the law. See Emma Green,
State-Mandated Mourning for Aborted Fetuses, THE ATLANTIC, May 14, 2016,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/state-mandated-mourning-for-abortedfetuses/482688/ [https://perma.cc/8DBC-5KDM] (discussing various reactions to Indiana fetal
remains disposition statute).
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those that led the Supreme Court in Hellerstedt I to strike down Texas’s
admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements,238 there
would be serious questions about whether the disposition requirement
could survive a constitutional challenge. But what occurred in the years
following Minnesota’s 1987 adoption of a fetal remains disposition
requirement similar to those in Indiana and Texas is instructive on this
point. Rather than decreasing, the number of abortion providers in
Minnesota actually increased from 13 to 14 between 1988 and 1992, a
period in which the abortion rate in the state was decreasing.239 Thus,
while the impact of fetal remains disposition requirements may vary from
state to state, if the experience of Minnesota is representative, such
requirements would not be expected to affect abortion access in the way
that troubled the Court in Hellerstedt I.
D. The Louisiana Statute
Like the DSHS regulations and the Indiana and Texas statutes, the
Louisiana statute currently subject to challenge in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana requires physicians to
dispose of aborted fetuses by burial and interment.240 It does so, however,
in substantially same way as the Louisiana law that the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana struck down in
Edwards. 241
For the most recent Louisiana statute, though, the advent of Casey’s
undue burden test solves some of the problems that plagued the fetal
remains disposition requirement at issue in Edwards and the later
Louisiana requirement the Eastern District declared unconstitutional in
Treen. For example, regardless of whatever other interests the new
238. See supra notes 92 & 97 and accompanying text (discussing Hellerstedt I)
239. See Stanley K. Henshaw and Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in the United States,
1991 and 1992, 26 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 102, 105 (May-June 1994), available at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2136033.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae032bff485be2469b41902
474589be66 [https://perma.cc/Q4FX-WCY6] (indicating that the number of abortion providers in
Minnesota in 1992 was 14 and had increased by 1 since 1988 and that the abortion rate per 1,000
women aged 15-44 in Minnesota was 18.2 in 1988 and 15.6 in 1992).
240. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.25(A) (2016) (requiring abortion providers to ensure that
fetal remains are disposed of in the same manner as other human remains); LA. STAT. ANN. (2018)
§ 8:651 (requiring that human remains be “decently interred or cremated”).
241. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text (discussing Edwards). Compare
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 221 n.129 (E.D. La. 1980) (indicating that the statute
at issue in the case stated: “Any physician who shall perform or induce an abortion upon a
pregnant woman shall insure that the remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a manner
consistent with the disposal of human remains as provided by R.S. 8:651 through 8:662.”); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.25(A) (2016) (“Each physician who performs or induces an abortion which
does not result in a live birth shall insure that the remains of the child are disposed of by interment
or cremation, in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 8:651 et seq.”).
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Louisiana law might serve, the state’s interest in protecting potential life
stands as a firm foundation for the law.242 Moreover, Webster, Casey, and
Gonzales all make clear that the ruling in Roe that a fetus does not
constitute a person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
bar the state from expressing its view about when life begins in an effort
to encourage childbirth over abortion.243 Finally, in Casey and Gonzales,
the Court emphasized its concern over the psychological harm a woman
might suffer if she chooses to have an abortion and later regrets that
choice, rather than focusing on the psychological harm that might result
from regulating abortion in a particular way.244
A couple of collateral consequences from Louisiana’s 2016 fetal
remains disposition requirement as originally enacted, though, presented
potential problems under Casey’s undue burden standard.245 In 2018, the
Louisiana legislature fixed one problem; the other one, however, persists.
In contrast to the DSHS regulations and the Indiana and Texas
statutes, an abortion provider’s obligations under Louisiana’s statute, as
originally enacted, were not limited to cases in which an aborted fetus is
removed outside the provider’s facility.246 Without amendment,
therefore, the statute might have operated as an effective ban on
medication abortions in which a woman delivers the fetus at home, where
disposition of the remains very likely would be out of the physician’s
242. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the interest in protecting potential life as it relates to
the Indiana and Texas fetal remains disposition requirements).
243. See supra notes 65, 71, & 198–99 and accompanying text (discussing a state’s ability
to encourage a woman to continue her pregnancy).
244. See supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s concerns in
Casey and Gonzales with respect to the potential for psychological harm).
245. The Louisiana statute applies to fetal remains resulting from an abortion, but not those
associated with a miscarriage. While disparate treatment of abortion may be permitted, the
Hellerstedt I Court indicated that the omission of medical treatment of miscarriages from Texas’s
ambulatory surgery center requirement undermined the reasonableness of the requirement. See
Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2315 (2016) (noting that “[m]edical treatment after an incomplete
miscarriage often involves a procedure identical to that involved in a nonmedical abortion, but it
often takes place outside a hospital or surgical center,” thereby suggesting that the ambulatory
surgery center requirement was not “‘reasonably related to’ preserving women’s health, the
asserted ‘purpos[e] of the Act in which it is found.’”). See also Complaint at 16, June Med. Servs.
LLC v. Gee, 136 S. Ct. 1354 (2016) (No. 16-CV-00444/BAJ-RLB) (claiming that Louisiana’s
fetal remains disposition requirement imposes obligations only on physicians performing
abortions and not on those providing medical care for miscarriages).
246. Contra IND. CODE § 16-41-16-7.6(a) (2017) (only requiring a health care facility to
comply with the disposition requirements if it is in possession of an aborted or miscarried fetus);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 697.004(a) (West 2017) (applying to “embryonic and fetal
tissue remains that are passed or delivered” at a health care provider’s facility); 25 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 1.133(a)(2)(G) (West 2017) (exempting from the disposition requirements “human tissue,
including fetal tissue, that is expelled or removed from the human body once the person is outside
of a healthcare facility”).
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control.247 And a ban of this type could represent an unconstitutional
burden to the extent that the procedure may be “necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the . . . health of the mother.”248
Of course, banning a particular abortion method is not necessarily
unconstitutional, as Gonzales attests, but sustaining such a ban would
likely require Louisiana to make a determination that the procedure is
never medically necessary.249 In any event, Louisiana’s fetal remains
disposition requirement no longer presents this problem because the state
amended the requirement to exclude fetal remains associated with a
medication abortion that is completed outside of the health care facility
in which the physician administered the medication and at a time when
the physician is not present.250
The legislature, however, has not taken action to fix a second potential
problem. Similar to the measure at issue in Edwards, the Louisiana statute
requires disposition of fetal remains in compliance with the state’s laws
governing human remains generally,251 and those laws give the
“surviving parents” of a deceased child the right to control the disposition
of the child’s body.252 Thus, one might argue that compliance would
require notification of the father and raise the same concerns that led the
Casey &RXUW WR VWULNH GRZQ 3HQQV\OYDQLDۑV VSRXVDO QRWLILFDWLRQ
UHTXLUHPHQW
247. See Hopkins v. Jegley, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1053 (E.D. Ark. 2017) (noting the
plaintiff’s claim that an Arkansas fetal remains disposition law would require him to stop
performing medication abortions); Complaint at 16, June Med. Servs. LLC v. Gee, 136 S. Ct.
1354 (2016) (No. 16-CV-00444/BAJ-RLB) (asserting that Louisiana’s fetal remains disposition
requirement may bar “first trimester medication abortion[s].”).
248. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007).
249. See id. at 166–67 (“The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over
whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman’s health, given the
availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives.”).
250. See H.B. 273, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018) (amending Louisiana’s fetal remains
disposition statute).
251. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.25(A) (2016) (requiring interment or cremation in
compliance with statute generally providing for disposal of human remains). Apparently,
requiring disposition in like manner as other human remains would have satisfied the court in
PPINK, assuming it had determined that Indiana had a legitimate interest in doing so. See PPINK,
265 F. Supp. 3d 859, 872 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (emphasizing ways in which Indiana’s fetal remains
disposition requirement treats fetal tissue in a manner that is different from how Indiana law treat
other human remains).
252. LA. STAT. ANN. § 8:655(A)(5) (2016).
253. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98 (1992) (evaluating
and ultimately determining unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute requiring pre-abortion
notification of a pregnant woman’s husband); Hopkins, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1104 (determining that
a fetal remains disposition requirement effectively required “notice to the other ‘parent’” and
thereby created an unconstitutional burden on a woman’s ability to choose to have an abortion).
The Louisiana statute allows for a court to determine the disposition of human remains “if the
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CONCLUSION
In the wake of Hellerstedt I, fetal remains disposition requirements
like those adopted in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas may become
increasingly popular among states that want to reduce the incidence of
abortion. Whether these statutes unconstitutionally infringe on a
woman’s right to choose abortion, as recognized by Roe, is not a question
to which Hellerstedt I provides a direct answer. The Hellerstedt I Court
did not consider whether and how the balancing test it found in Casey
might apply when a state seeks to protect potential life. Consequently, to
understand how to evaluate the constitutionality of a regulation founded
on that interest, one must look through Hellerstedt I to Casey itself and
to the Court’s decision to uphold the federal partial-birth abortion ban in
Gonzales.
When doing so, it becomes apparent that the mere possibility that an
abortion regulation could encourage a woman to choose childbirth over
abortion is sufficient to sustain the regulation under Casey’s undue
burden standard and that such a regulation will not violate that standard
unless the burdens the regulation imposes constitute a “substantial
obstacle” to a woman’s ability to choose to have an abortion.254 The
district courts in PPINK and Hellerstedt II correctly pointed out that a
fetal remains disposition requirement can do nothing to protect the life of
an aborted fetus, but those courts miss the point. By requiring health care
facilities to treat the remains of aborted and miscarried fetuses in a
manner similar to how the remains of born human beings are treated, the
state expresses its view of when life begins and thus advances its interest
in protecting potential life by contributing to a “dialogue that [will] better
inform[] the political and legal systems, the medical profession, expectant
authorization of the person or persons with the right to control disposition cannot be obtained.”
LA. STAT. ANN. § 8:655(E) (2016). Given that Casey bars spousal notification requirements, one
might argue that the right of the father “cannot be obtained,” but even so, a court might find that
the risk that notification may be required could “deter [some women] from procuring an abortion
as surely as if [Louisiana] had outlawed abortion in all cases.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
Similar to the Louisiana statute, Indiana’s fetal remains requirement incorporates by
reference other statutes that give “surviving parents” rights as to the disposition of the remains of
a deceased child, with one parent who is present being able to decide if reasonable efforts were
made to notify the other. See IND. CODE § 16-34-3-4(c) (2017) (providing for the application of
certain laws “concerning the authorization of disposition of human remains,” which laws grant
rights to the parents of a deceased child), invalidated by Planned Parenthood of Ind. and Ky. v.
Comm’r, 888 F.3d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 2018). Given that the Indiana law specifically gives “[a]
pregnant woman who has an abortion … the right to determine the final disposition of the aborted
fetus,” however, the more specific statute should override the general ones incorporated by
reference, thereby reducing the potential that the law will be interpreted to require consultation
with the father. IND. CODE § 16-34-3-2(a) (2017).
254. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

49

Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 4

1096

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

mothers, and society as a whole of the consequences that follow from a
decision to elect . . . abortion.255 Indeed, the very existence of fetal
remains disposition requirements like those adopted in Indiana, Texas,
and Louisiana might cause a woman to choose not to have an abortion,
and, so long as they do not operate in a manner that would preclude a
woman from making the “ultimate decision,”256 the Hellerstedt I
balance—if applicable—should tip in the state’s favor.
By their very nature, fetal remains disposition requirements apply
only to fetuses who have died. But this is of no moment for constitutional
purposes. To serve its interest in protecting potential life, a state may
proclaim life after death.

255. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 129 (2007).
256. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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